這是紅綠研究會成員鄧肯‧湯普森在【工會、環境與全球化】研討會中的專題演講稿，漢譯文在前，英文在後。
他在這場演講中，分析了以英國首相布萊爾派為主的新工黨以及所謂的「第三條路」政治實踐經驗，並且從紅綠研究會的觀點進行了批判。
─────────────────
「第三條路」與新工黨
The Third Way and New Labour
鄧肯‧湯普森（Duncan Thompson）
引 言
「第三條路」是如此聲名狼藉，以致我們很難去討論任何細節。雖然安東尼．紀登斯（Anthony Giddens）嘗試去闡釋這個術語，但外界還是認為他語意含糊；認為他只是無意義的片語上打轉，而沒有去正視那些困難的議題。但假如「第三條路」難以在細節上進行討論（這並不令人驚訝，在廣義的「第三條路」陣營之間存在著很多差異），它的一般意義卻還是相當清楚的。它是歷史上那些中間左翼（centre-left）回應「社會民主」的危機的一種嘗試（紀登斯的「第三條路」出版於1998年，副標是「社會民主的更新」），同時試圖在當代全球化的資本主義範疇之中，去發展出「第三條路」擁護者口中所謂的「進步」政治。
首先，我要做的是透過檢視社會民主的危機，把「第三條路」放進歷史的情境來討論，「第三條路」是一種對該危機的特殊回應。有了對較大圖像的描述，我希望讀者能了解，我稍微詳細地討論英國經驗是有用的。並設法解釋為何要談論源自英國的「第三條路」──透過紀登斯及其他人的作品，以及英國首相布萊爾（Tony Blair）與新工黨（New Labour）的政治實踐所呈現出來的；同時也探討它要實踐什麼，以及談談「第三條路」的反對者。
一、定位「第三條路」
1. 終戰之後的社會福利制度
那麼，就先從「何謂社會民主？」開始，或者，至少從「在西歐的脈絡下，社會民主意謂著什麼？」開始討論。當然，我將簡化來談談非常廣泛的一般性通論；不過，為了這篇文章的目的，我們如果沒有將「社會民主」定義為戰後西歐社會經濟體制，那最起碼要將之視為支配這種體制的政治論述。歷史上來看，這些制度是建立在法西斯主義的潰敗，以及古典自由放任的資本主義之徹底破產（因為它導致戰爭與大蕭條）。戰後體制的主要國內構成要素是國家角色的擴大：國家要提供基本的服務（如英國的「全民健康服務」﹝National Health Service﹞【註一】，將策略性工業（例如煤礦業、鐵路等等）改為公有制，以及財政需求管理上的凱因思主義手段。在確保國家經濟管理效率方面，國家的角色主要藉由布列敦森林體系（Bretton Woods regime）的國際金融架構來支撐，以便進行匯率管理與資本控制。
當然，戰後的社會福利制度在西歐任何國家裡，都不是由左翼力量所實踐。它的起源在於1945年進步的「光榮時刻」（戰勝了法西斯主義），但是，很快地就被1947年另一個「光榮時刻」所接收：其基本宗旨是冷戰反共，捍衛資本主義與西方帝國主義（繼續反對民族解放運動）。雖然，社會福利體制相當程度上是立基在有組織的勞工力量上，也勉強可以算是左翼政黨在政治的成功，同時也讓廣泛的勞工階級獲取許多社會性利益，但是，它同時是一種複雜、曖昧模糊的建制，同樣的也奠基於反社會主義的歐洲基督教民主黨政策裡，甚至於，它是對資本需求的一種回應（當然，凱因斯本人就是反社會主義者，他堅決地要拯救資本主義，以免資本主義毀於其自身無政府的胡做非為）。資本競爭的自由放任（laissez-faire）導致週期性的危機：於是，最好是在資本家生產與交換時的「無政府狀態」裡，加進一些秩序以便達成資本的總體利益；或許這就是必要的鐘擺形式，以翁理‧皮赫內（Henri Pirenne）【註二】的話來說，從「經濟自由」到矯正式的「經濟管制」之間的循環。這套社會福利體制，在西歐因戰後長期的經濟成長而持續，似乎成功地終止了週期性的經濟不景氣──在過去，這曾被標示為具有危機傾向的資本主義的特色。這套社會福利制度，同時也保持了資本的獲利需求與勞工的滿足。用霍布斯邦（Eric Hobsbawm）的話來說，當時是經濟繁榮的「黃金時代」。
然而，左派更強烈地認同這些變化，而且長期下來，顯然左派也從中獲得利益。工業化與都市化增加，強化了階級差距，工會獲得了新的後備軍，同時也擴張了左翼政黨的選票基礎。在70年代中期，北歐各國的社會民主黨都贏得了政權。
2. 社會民主的危機
支撐戰後社會福利體制的長期經濟成長，在60年代末期就逐漸地消退，這很快地曝露了這種體制的妥協特質與內在的不穩定性。它所能獲得的利益已經被壓榨殆盡，生產活動也無法足夠地成長，而凱因斯式的經濟刺激手段，則被經濟上的「停滯型通貨膨脹」（stagflation）──來自經濟蕭條與通貨膨脹的同時衝擊──所打敗。甚至，布列敦森林協定（Bretton Woods agreement）國際金融架構也開始瓦解，美國尼克森政府把美元從金本位制（gold standard）中撤出，隨後導致貨幣流通的不穩定，造成了投機性金融市場的興起。
戰後社會福利體制的危機，誘發了尖銳的政治兩極化。中間偏左與中間偏右兩者之間的廣泛共識瓦解。然而，左翼的立場變得更強了。先進資本主義國家裡，勞工的制度性力量似乎已經更為鞏固，並且提出了更為進步的政治綱領。西歐戰後長期經濟成長的終止，是由60年代末與70年代初大罷工風潮（法國的「五月風暴」（French May），義大利的「炎熱之秋」（Italian hot autumn）等等）揭開序幕；而左翼則是出現了冷戰開始以來所未見的團結（同時也反應了廣大的社會不滿），而且歷經了一定程度的基進化。革命震撼了葡萄牙，同時西班牙和希臘的獨裁者也垮台。法國與義大利共產主義政黨的力量也增強，在左翼政府的選舉聯盟裡也提昇了實力，他們可能比北歐的社會民主黨都要來的基進。
不過，當有些人在社會民主或社會主義上，尋求更加進步的形式（例如，法國左派所談的「與資本主義決裂」（rupture with capitalism），瑞典社會民主黨藉由「麥登計劃﹝Meidner Plan﹞」提出漸進的社會主義化，以及英國工黨左翼標舉著「另類的經濟策略」等等）的時候，真正的經濟危機受益者現在看來是新自由主義取向的新右派（a neo-liberal New Right），他們高談要廢除戰後凱因斯主義式的社會福利制度，以便於資本可以從政府的管制與財稅政策中掙脫出來而自由移動。左翼由於過度認同舊秩序，因而最後無法面對來自激進右派的挑戰。
3.新右派的勝利
新右派高奏凱歌的歷史過程過於冗長也過於複雜，我們無法在這篇文章裡細談。我們在這裡只談新自由主義的全球化：從過去到現在以及未來，推動全球化的動力一直是來自於資本主義的固有傾向：資本集中化、普世化以及技術革新；新右派要去翻轉社會福利體制的得利結果以及要讓西方資本主義重掌全球大局的決心，則增強了這些趨勢。
工人的力量被大量失業所削弱，也被部分資本的攻擊所消解（國家則在後面支持）；工會遭受到一連串罷工失敗的打擊，例如義大利在1980年的飛雅特（FIAT）汽車工廠事件；美國在1981年解僱了11,000名「航管人員工會」（Professional Air Traffic Controllers’ Organisation）的會員【註三】；最後，英國礦工在1984到1985年維持了一年的罷工也以失敗收場。
冷戰中，西方在地緣政治與意識型態的勝利（所謂1989年的革命，1991年蘇聯的崩解）導致有些人高談著「歷史的終結」，同時西方世界一再重申其勢力，藉由國際貨幣基金（IMF）與世界銀行（World Bank）的「結構調整」政策宰制了南半球，形成了李奧‧潘尼區（Leo Panitch）所說的「帝國主義之新自由主義的新時代」（new era of imperial neo-liberalism）【註四】。
總而言之，來自新右派的攻擊，強化了資本在國際上以及各國國內面對勞工時的力量，導致了左派巨大的挫退與失敗。70年代的左派一度生龍活虎，想要超越資本主義的，但是到了80、90年代，那些中間偏左政黨與工會受到抑制的領導幹部，只抱著一種最低層次的「現實主義」──例如，讚美市場的勝利，以及提出能夠與現存資本秩序愉快地和解的政策。原先由法國總統密特朗（Mitterrand，屬法國社會黨）在1981至1983年所提出的進步綱領被放棄了；在美國主導的國際投資壓力下，似乎宣佈了：針對戰後體制的危機，左派想要找到一種屬於左翼的解決方式是不可能的。
4.英國的特殊性
以上雖然只是很簡短大綱式的描述，我們已經看到社會民主的危機與新右派的勝利。當然，事實上此過程的細節非常多樣，每一個國家所經歷（也將繼續經歷中）的變化都不一樣，這反映了各國在全球經濟階層的位置，以及不同國家歷史與文化差異之複雜性。不過，「第三條路」的提出，卻是國際性的（譬如像紀登斯最初關於「第三條路」的書，被翻譯成了25種語言）。我認為，不論是紀登斯的意識型態論述，或是首相布萊爾與新工黨的政治實踐，「第三條路」之所以會出現在英國不是一件偶然的事。
關於戰後凱因斯式社會福利體制危機的政治紛擾，在英國顯得特別嚴重。在1979年執政的柴契爾夫人（Margaret Thatcher）是新右派裡最張牙舞爪的倡導者。保守黨在她領導下，先是在1979年成功地成為國會改選後的多數黨，接著在1983與1987年的國會大選裡也都連續獲勝，接續柴契爾領導保守黨的梅傑（John Major），也在1992年大選中獲勝。不過，保守黨的得票率從來都沒有突破過43%，──保守黨的成功，主因來自於分裂的反對陣營，從1979年起，工黨（the Labour Party）內部為了決定黨未來的走向而發生嚴重鬥爭，這導致工黨分裂出一個新的政黨（即英國社會民主黨，Social Democratic Party，簡稱SDP），此新政黨與立基於中產階級的自由黨結盟，成功地佔據了政治光譜的中間地帶。英國的選舉制度並沒有採取比例代表制，使得保守黨面對分裂的反對陣營時，可以在選票未過半的情況下就單獨執政。於是，早在「第三條路」或「新工黨」被提出之前，就已經有一股頗具影響力的聲音，倡議著中間派與左派的重新結盟，以便奪取中產階級的選票，呼籲工黨與自由黨聯合起來作為「基進中間派」進步聯盟的一部份。這種結盟，自然而然地使工黨開始拋棄社會主義的任何承諾──雖然這個承諾本身離社會主義仍然有一段距離。
這段期間，左派遭受到嚴重的失敗。柴契爾廢除了反對她立場的地方政府，把之前進步的左翼工黨執政時所發展出來的實驗性政策全部廢除。她採用正面的攻擊摧毀了當時持續了一年（1984-1985）的礦工罷工，同時通過反工會的立法，決定性地削弱了工會的力量。每一次選舉的失敗，就推著工黨越來越往右靠攏，工黨所謂「黨要現代化」的主張，使得其民主內涵越來越空洞，同時導致黨的領導方式越來越走向黨主席制（presidential style of leadership）。英國左翼的影響力，在80年代初期還很強大，至此在工黨內被排除殆盡。工黨最具象徵的信念，即原先在黨綱第四條理所陳述的：「生產工具公有制」（common ownership of the means of production），終於在1995年被刪除（取而代之的，是一些漂亮但模糊的承諾，以及對「市場冒險與競爭的嚴格確保」之背書）。同時，湯尼‧布萊爾（Tony Blair）獨斷地把工黨改名為「新工黨」。選舉制度的本質，排除了獨立左派政治團隊的形成；而且在選舉上，工會與其他社會團體依然還是把工黨信奉為保守黨之外的唯一選擇。對他們來說，工黨向右邊的柴契爾新自由主義看齊似乎是可以寬恕，因為，這是唯一可以取得國會多數好把保守黨趕下臺的方式。
於是，撇開西方資本主義在地緣政治與意識型態上戰勝了東方共產主義陣營（主要伴隨的是蘇聯的瓦解）不談，也且先不談這段時期資本主義世界經濟的加速全球化，英國的左派力量遠比其它相似的國家來得衰弱。譬如英國的鄰居法國，早在左派1997年選舉的勝利之前，也就是1994-1995年冬季，就由公共部門的工會領導了民眾的大動員，抗議當時政府削減社會支出的計劃。儘管他們仍有明顯的限制，剛從法國總統大選中失利的喬斯潘（Jospin）政府，也絕不可能搞出像英國布萊爾那種聖戰式的新自由主義變革；而且，無論社會黨的喬斯潘自己的偏好為何，有其左翼聯盟夥伴（共產黨與綠黨）選票實力在一旁監督，至少對喬斯潘造成了一定的牽制。
5.新工黨的處境
現在，要下結論還太早，但我在這裡想要提出的是，比起其它更廣泛的左派歷史實踐經驗來說，「第三條路」的處境並沒有什麼意義。我要論證的是，「第三條路」是一種企圖，想要提供意識型態的假象來掩飾那種「最低限度的現實主義」（minimalist realism），換句話說，也就是要掩飾像新工黨這樣的「中間左派」；在新自由主義全球化的限制之下，他們努力讓自己適應僅存的窄小策略空間之中，而這些限制程度在英國特別嚴重（最起碼比起其它西歐國家）：英國左派遭受到連續四次選舉失敗的創傷，勞工與工會實力的虛弱，以及柴契爾式個人主義在意識型態上明顯的優勢。「第三條路」是少數知識份子的精心傑作──現實上並沒有一個有關「第三條路」的「社會運動」──，我認為，這是中間左派心中的空白與空虛所顯現的症狀。這是對於這段期間左派連續挫敗的反應以及合理化行為。
近20年來，英國整個政治光譜全部都向右移動。曾經有人開玩笑說，只要選擇一個的政治立場然後一直保持著不動，最多等6個月，你就變成左派了！羅伊‧哈特斯里（Roy Hattersley），他在1983-1992年是工黨黨主席尼爾‧金諾克（Neil Kinnock）的副手，而且原來是工黨右翼的象徵人物，他是黨內少數堅持著不變政治信念的人之一。現在他的立場，在政治光譜上竟然是屬於新工黨的批判左翼了。
新工黨是如此偏執地迷戀「新」這個詞，任何他們判斷為好的事務，一定要自動地在前面加個「新」字點綴一下，同時它所遇到的障礙，不管它是來自左派或右派，一定要在前面加個「舊的∕老的」（old）或是「保守的」來形容。（在這個意義上，他們把左翼政治、工會與公共服務部門視為「保守的」。）這種對於新奇以及「現代化」的偏執，在本質上是跟隨著資本主義全球化的紋路相並行的。
讓我們舉個例子，就以推動「彈性化的勞動力市場」來說好了。
既然整個英國的政治光譜都已經向右移動，那麼，與西歐經驗的進行比較，對於定位布萊爾與新工黨是特別有啟發性的。新自由主義全球化的一個關鍵面向是有關「彈性化勞動市場」的問題，這是指解僱工人、限制勞動權利以及壓低工資的難易程度。英國已經走上「彈性化勞動市場」的路上，向美國的低工資經濟看齊──失業率是降低了，但是貧窮工人的數目卻上升了。在西歐，有許多人反對這種制度，而布萊爾卻卻公然地和義大利的極右政客貝魯斯孔尼（Berlusconi）【註五】結盟──後者為政貪污而腐敗，並且和新法西斯黨與公然的種族主義政黨結盟；同樣在此隊伍的是西班牙的阿茨納爾（Aznar）──一個歐洲最右翼政黨的領導者。對於勞動彈性化制度，在義大利與西班牙已經有重大的抗議示威，今年以來，在義大利以及西班牙，已經有幾個大規模示威與24小時的總罷工，值得一提的是，經過保守黨的反工會立法之後，這在英國可是違法的！而布萊爾執政至今，也沒有顯示出他要廢除這些法令！從擁抱了幾個新自由主義全球化的面向來看，布萊爾早就表明他已經變成中間偏右的基督教民主黨理的右翼了。
二、紅綠觀點對「第三條路」的批判
1.資本主義的終極不可控制性（The ultimate uncontrollability of capitalism）
我把「第三條路」和「新工黨」這兩個詞交替使用──雖然這不完全公平。在新工黨內部的政治光譜上，我想，無論如何，我們可以很確定的把紀登斯歸為「黨內左派」，一位對新工黨表現有些失望的人。而且，雖然紀登斯是「第三條路」裡最有名的思想家，不過，關於「第三條路」還是有其他重要的思想家，例如：威爾‧修頓（Will Hutton），他是《觀察家》雜誌（The Observer）的編輯，也是一本廣泛討論第三條路的書──《我們的當前處境》（The State We’re In，1995）──的作者，他對於布萊爾政府以及全球化效應就採取較為批判性的立場。舉例來說，修頓就譴責1999年的布萊爾–施熱德報告書（the Blair-Schröder paper）為「新自由主義原則的一種駭人陳述」【註六】。
我把這些人都混在一起談的原因是，進步的「第三條路」的整體概念──無論你在細節上如何定義──共同有個信念：世界上為數眾多的社會問題與環境問題可以在世界所自我加諸的限制中被處理，換言之，在資本主義的範疇中，認為資本主義實際上是「世界的第二本質」，是「當代世界社會生活所不可逃脫的範圍」【註七】。然而，「第三條路」這類觀點的失敗之處在於，沒有認知到資本主義裡天生具有的敵對性格。「第三條路」反而去鼓吹「共同體」──為了共同目標的共同體──的迷思，事實上，根本沒有這種共同體存在。因此，與「第三條路」相關的觀點中，存在了很大程度的一廂情願的想法──或根本那只是一種虛偽的假裝？譬如，紀登斯認為資本家應該「負責任地」行動【註八】，然而，這在現實裡，卻沒有任何單一個體、單一企業，或任何有權有勢的人等，可以脫離市場的獨裁力量來行事。
在我們進一步討論之前，我們要簡短地強調，從我們紅綠觀點來看，資本主義是一個問題所在。為什麼？因為，用伊斯璠‧梅思查羅思（István Mészáros）【註九】的話來說，資本主義是「在社會新陳代謝的控制中，最終將不受控制的模式」【註十】，它不只創造出社會配置的無數錯亂，而且現在，還從根本上威脅到地球上的生態。
「比起其它制度而言，一個成功的市場經濟能創造出更多的經濟繁榮」，紀登斯如是說（Giddens, 2000, p.35）。…是的，的確如此，而且伴隨著大量的環境破壞，已經超過地球現在的「緩衝能力」（buffering capacity）所能負荷的程度了【註十一】。儘管我們都知道應該在什麼時候止步，不過重點是，資本主義就是無法停下來。資本主義只有兩條出路：不是成長，就是死亡。資本不會順從地受控制，不可控制性正是它的本質。
所以，當我接受紀登斯所說的概念：「經濟的全球化…是個現實。」時，這不表示我會跟著接受他所強加的論點：認為社會主義就已經是「不可能了」【註十二】，「沒人能再提出替代資本主義的另類選擇」【註十三】。去接受了當代資本主義改變了的領域，根本不能從根本去改變資本主義的特質。相反的，這使得尋找另類出路更為急迫。我們所需要的是，在全球化的時代裡，我們要徹底全面地思考反資本主義的政略的觀點。當然，這是一個極為龐大的問題，幸好，這不是這篇文章需要去仔細討論的！！
現在，我們有充足的理由來說，資本主義根本上的不可控制性，最終將使得任何一種「第三條路」都失效。其最好的結果只是：「第三條路」所應允的改良，在資本邏輯底下無法完全地實現；最糟糕的結果是：它顯露在外的是一種體面的修飾，背後隱藏的，實際上是對新自由主義全球化的默認。「第三條路」否認了任何一種替代資本主義的可能性，散播著一種幻想，以為透過改良就能讓資本主義完美。事實上，我們所能真正選擇的依然只有兩種：要嘛是社會主義，不然就是野蠻主義。
2.改良的侷限
當然，現在很多人都緊捉著「最終地」（ultimately）這個字不放。因為懷疑會有突然的大崩潰（Big Bang）去終結資本主義，顯然在社會主義或野蠻主義這一面向外，還存有多種不同可能的資本主義。有幾個問題要思考一下：我們應該很確定地致力於改革好能馴服資本主義，建立民主制度，提供一種替代性的機構，以此手段來增強社會力量，進而最終克服資本？如果改革突然碰上資本的阻礙，我們有可能去推垮這些障礙，建立管制規範的統理機制（regulatory governance）？這不就是戰後社會民主體制的成就嗎？有一種可以使資本家對社會「負起責任」的做法，就是強化管制規範的架構。威爾‧修頓（不是紀登斯）喜歡把歐陸以及東亞的「管理是資本主義」──把商業資本的投機趨力壓抑在生產性資本的長期需求之下──拿來跟「盎格魯薩克遜」的股東制資本主義模式進行對照。
現在，我們依序來看看兩個主要問題：管制規範與民主制度。
歷史上來看，社會民主體制比較能夠好好對付的資本部門，是全國性的大公司。這類公司是資本密集的，較受到地緣的限制，同時比較偏好得以確保長期安全的措施（而且，毫無疑問的，也偏好寡占的競爭）。然而，當今佔優勢的資本部門，卻都是無根漂流不受束縛的。金融市場的快速成長，導致投機性資本勝過了生產性資本；儘管即使製造業的生產是藉由外包網絡的短期契約，其本身不再像過去那樣非得鑲嵌在一定國家內部，但仍然不敵投機性資本。同時，「自由企業」與「自由貿易」的意識型態高奏凱歌，削弱了管制規範的信念──即使這樣做也會帶給特定工業資本部門帶來利益。更嚴重的是，勞工內部──在任何重新形成的管理規範機制（reconstituted regulatory）與社會民主政體，勞工都是其背後的基本社會力量──比起以往更加區隔（區分成不同專業、技術、年齡、性別、種族，等等），在一國範圍內是如此，更別說是全球的範圍了。因此，任何「第三條路」式的社會民主重建過程，都會反映出今天全球性社會力量的不均衡──也就是呈現了資本的再結構化與攻擊性，以及，資本的力量遠勝過勞工。此趨勢鼓動的是──即使這不完全是由華盛頓當局在背後教唆的──繼續朝向侵蝕經濟統理機制（economic governance）的形式，同時，對於全球經濟中資本的破壞性以及其投機利益的約束將越來越少。一些或許可以扮演經濟統理機制角色的機構，例如世界貿易組織（the World Trade Organisation，WTO）和世界銀行，事實上卻成為新自由主義全球化的幕後推手。「第三條路」最大的根本弱點在於：無法精確地分析出哪些社會力量可以對資本進行限制。
無論如何，還是有一些樂觀的理由。雖然新自由主義意識型態的猛烈攻擊，一般人還是保有社會民主的價值，──例如，捍衛公有部門以對抗私有化，特別是關於健保與教育部門──這是難以去除的。還有，中間左派的政黨領導人有關「第三條路」的說辭也已經破綻百出。因此，我們越來越清楚，在社會與環境保護標準的防衛上（且先別說什麼改善或促進），與當代資本主義的需求毫不相容。如果說，面對過去二十幾年以來資本主義的轉型，社會民主福利體制想再次扮演它在國家內部（甚至區域內部）的角色是日益困難的話，那麼，這可能告訴我們，對基進左派來說，舊式社會民主的空間明顯地縮小了，在眼前的選項只剩下兩個：要嘛像「第三條路」一樣，全面認同新自由主義秩序，不然就是積極投身於更明確的（同時也是國際主義地）反資本主義的政治行動當中。
三、新工黨的政治實踐
以上就是我所理解的較大的圖像。在做結論之前，我想對英國狀況做一些更加詳細的說明，同時談一下新工黨政府的記錄，舉些例子：像民主改革、新工黨與勞工運動的關係，以及它在環境保護上的記錄。
1.新工黨與民主制度
對紀登斯來說，在「風險」日益增加以及個人主義日趨盛行的世界裡，民主改革被視為可以促進「社會包容力」（social inclusion）。對新工黨來說，遲未兌現的憲法改革是其綱領裡的重要條文，為它添增了一些基進色彩之後，和諧地與政治「中間派」（自由派、88憲章﹝Charter 88﹞，等等）相互唱和。然而，我們來看看新工黨的政績（以最好方式湊補起來的）：對於早就答應要給蘇格蘭國會與威爾斯國民議會的承諾，新工黨居然在最後一刻給予不必要的刁難（雖然這些權利都是工黨第一個任期中，由公民投票所依法給予的）；保證改革後的上議院仍可以盡量不依民主方式運作；就推動比例代表制的立法而言，新工黨則幾乎完全放棄了這個政治目標；諸如像市長直選的設計，則遭遇到最大的抗拒（至於在實行這類選舉的地方，都證明了政府的窘困，像東北英格蘭的哈特爾普鎮﹝Hartlepool﹞在鎮長選舉時，有人把自己打扮成猴子參選，其政見之一是承諾免費提供香蕉給學童！【註十四】。順帶提一句，新工黨的集中控制的反應是──「控制上癮」，例如在處理威爾斯國民議會領導人的選舉，以及倫敦第一次市長直選，這兩次都讓布萊爾火燒屁股：而且，他的策略都有效地造成這兩個地方的布萊爾派（Blairite）候選人落選。
投票率繼續下跌，最近一次2001年的國會改選，投票率只有59%；1999年的歐洲議會改選，英國地區的投票率只有23%。為什麼投票率這麼低？因為，基本上，現在「中間左派」已經和新自由主義結為一家親，選民事實上沒有什麼好選擇的。從大眾的觀點來看，在既有的主要政黨中，真的是沒有什麼好選擇的了──沒有什麼能比這點更能證明新工黨的空洞。傳統的工黨選民，現在傾向在投票日當天留在家裡──選民棄權是對新工黨最大的選舉威脅。
更重要的，或許不用多說，在「第三條路」或新工黨的隊伍裡，沒有人想要在最有意義的領域，也就是在經濟活動的決策形成過程中，建議引進民主措施。新工黨只有在不威脅到資本的地方允許民主制度。就這個特別的理由來說，要挑戰資本，民主的擴展與深化也就非常重要，而重新出發的左翼政治必須找到鼓舞衷心參與的出路，特別是在：更獨立的地方與區域政府中，公共部門的決策與行政之中，以及在社會經濟活動中「第三部門」的發展上。
2.新工黨與勞工運動
在英國最敏感的單一政治議題，或許就是「私有化」了（因為這也是柴契爾她反社會主義聖戰的關鍵部分）。甚至，也正是這個議題把新工黨搞到與勞工運動相對峙的局面。在國營企業大拍賣（major selling off）之後，現在新工黨把私有化的形式改稱為「公─私部門夥伴制」（public-private partnerships，簡稱PPPs）──包含了多樣配置的設計，以鼓勵私有部門參與控制公有部門。最受爭議的，而且最讓私人企業從這類配置中獲利的，是大家所知的「私人金融發起制」（private finance initiatives，簡稱PFIs），這是1992年所引進的制度。阿里森‧波洛克教授（Professor Allyson Pollock），倫敦大學健康與服務研究單位的主席，以及「私人金融發起制」的嚴厲批判者，把這些制度稱為（總價達30兆英鎊的）「掏金熱」（gold rush）。
「私人金融發起制」是複雜的，但是，用簡單的術語來說是：政府支付預算給私人公司，或者更普遍的是金融借貸集團所組成的一些公司，讓他們參與公共部門的一些工作──包括主要的基礎建設計劃，例如像新醫院以及倫敦地鐵的更新與營運計劃等。當然，這當中有著一堆問題，──契約承包商可以任意降低工業安全性、工資以及工作條件等等，這也是工會反對私有化最主要的理由。但同時，現在的法令已經不允許工會針對像私有化之類的政策進行抗爭了。
對政府而言，最明顯的獲利是，在公有企業即將歸屬私有時，最初給付給此計畫的錢，不會在政府的資產負債表上，讓政府顯現為借方，於是這也就不會增加公共部門的舉債要求（Public Sector Borrowing Requirement，簡稱PSBR），現在則稱之為公共部門淨現金要求（Public Sector Net Cash Requirement ，簡稱PSNCR）──它自身是政府會計中一種非必要的繁瑣形式：會計的另一種形式改被私有化的對手所倡導（例如像政府總體金融赤字﹝General Government Financial Deficit，或簡稱GGFD﹞）。但長期下來，私有化卻導致更高的成本，也就是說，即使在投標競爭結束之後，「得標承包商」實質上還可以實質地增加成本的估算。例如，我們已經計算得知，與原本公共融資的醫院平均成本支出相比，同樣的成本支出在「私人金融發起制」下，醫院平均短少30%的病床【註十五】。一個簡單、而且更好的制度設計選擇，應該是提高必要公債的借貸，或者發行政府或公共部門的債券。對於「私人金融發起制」（PFIs）的批評，在於其缺乏責任機制。以所謂「商業機密」（commercial confidentiality）為由，這套制度更完全否認最低度的民主監察（又是一個腐蝕民主的例子）。
工會與新工黨的第二個主要爭執是，政府並沒有撤銷反工會的法律。這些西歐國家中最殘酷的反工會法律規章，是80與90年代保守黨執政時所制定的。而現在的事實是，雖然受到壓力，但布萊爾似乎還是對於英國擁有西歐國家最嚴苛限制的工會法令感到相當驕傲。「廢除反工會惡法聯盟」（the United Campaign to Repeal the Anti Trade Union Laws）成立於1998年，即新工黨取得執政不到一年時。然而，和私有化的議題相比，大眾比較不支持廢除這些法令；同時，溫和派與親新工黨的工會領導人，也都不願意支持「廢除反工會惡法聯盟」。
綜上所述，最重要的還是私有化計劃的持續推動，這使得工會與工黨之間的歷史連結出現了很大的問題。
當然，是工會創建了工黨【註十六】，而且一直到不久前，工會還是工黨的主要支持者。一直到1980年代時，工黨的財務來源有90%是來自工會；但到了1995年，則下跌到50%；在1999年時，從黨的會計帳面上來看，更下跌到只有30%。這個下跌的趨勢，是因為黨已經可以從別處取得贊助經費的結果，其中，大多數是來自富有的個別支持者；另外的原因來自工會的削減捐助，他們一點一點地把以往捐助工黨的錢給降低了。
2001年選舉時，因為公共部門工會的反對私有化立場增強（雖然私營部門工會對此議題沒有那麼顯著的意見），導致部分工會毅然而然地把捐助新工黨的錢給撤回（其中，最近一次的是RMT工會【註十七】，因為政府不願意把鐵路收歸公有，於是終止以往對工黨的捐助）。目前，英國嘗試走向政黨公費補助制度，很清楚地就是對於這些變化的一個回應，這可能說明了，新工黨自己很高興可以和工會切斷關係。同時，新工黨從有錢的生意人那裡取得經費的比例，越來越高。例如，在2001年的選舉中，從工會那裡失落的600萬英鎊之捐款，則改從三大富翁那裡取得610萬英鎊的援助──這三個人是：上議院議員聖斯伯利（Lord Sainsbury）【註十八】、哈姆林（Lord Hamlyn）【註十九】與翁大提耶爵士（Sir Christopher Ondaatje）【註二十】。
然而，工會的「政治獻金」要捐給誰呢？目前並沒有其他明顯的另類選擇。雖然自由民主黨（the Liberal Democrats）──一個概念上的中間黨派，比起其它主要政黨而言，發現自己的政治立場比新工黨更為左傾──願意捍衛公共部門，使得它贏得工會幹部的友誼，不過，在工會與自由民主黨之間，任何可預見的形式上結盟似乎仍很遙遠。
3.新工黨與環境問題
實話實說，環境問題在新工黨裡還未排上政治議程表。新工黨的一般原則似乎是這樣，它會發出一些正面的聲音，等到觸犯到既得利益的時候，然後又退縮回去。查爾斯‧希克利特（Charles Secrett），「地球之友」（Friends of the Earth）的領導者，最近他評論新工黨政府五年來只是「明顯的湊合縫補品」（distinctly patchy），並帶著一些「嚴重的失敗」，特別是關於運輸政策方面。
在那些需要從問題的根本加以解決的地方，政府就把一付拖拖拉拉的樣子。從一連串嚴重致命的火車意外，就可以清楚看出保守黨鐵路私有化的混亂特色：鐵路的營運與鐵軌的維修，分別交付給不同的公司經營，維修工作改為外包，模糊不輕的責任分工，以及，安全標準必然的降低。去年（2001年）哈特菲爾（Hatfield）的火車相撞事件之後，在進行全國鐵軌安全檢查的時候實施了較低的時速限制，造成了連續數個月火車嚴重脫班或取消班次。政府只想避免被責備與責任歸咎，可是卻沒有考慮重新收歸國有（雖然，「英國鐵軌公司」（Railtrack）【註二十一】，這家擁有鐵路並且理論上應該也要對之進行維修的公司，實際上已經破產，政府已經擁有部分的所有權，同時政府也支付巨額補償給那些前股東們）。也因此，「全國鐵路、海運、運輸工人聯盟」（RMT）撤回了他們給工黨的捐助。
更通常可見的的是，交通政策在持續缺乏公共運輸投資的情況下持續倒退，同時大量地過度依賴私人汽車──雖然1997年新工黨原先承諾說要遏止汽車的過度使用。前保守黨政府時的造路計劃（如M11公路要延伸到東倫敦、溫撤斯特﹝Winchester﹞高架道路、紐伯利﹝Newbury﹞高架道路等等），在過去都是環保抗議直接行動的主要焦點，布萊爾政府對此就比較謹慎，以避免過去以來那些大部分任何激發民怨的事發生（唯一例外只有北伯明罕﹝Birmingham﹞的替代道路計劃）。
對新工黨的第一個任期的定論時機，同時也是對它一次最嚴重的挑戰，出現在兩年前對徵收燃料稅的抗議風潮，這導致公路運輸業者──小企業們──在許多區域封鎖了車站與路段，把整個英國癱瘓了一個禮拜（同時加油站佈滿車陣；而恐慌的民眾拼命購買汽油貯存）。布萊爾政府似乎沒有能力控制局勢，最後是在基礎服務設施（像醫院）受到威脅的時候，停止了這場抗議。然而，從此新工黨政府就更加小心謹慎，以免被視為反汽車或反公路，然後計劃說要再開一百條的公路。原來要把交通政策轉為偏向大眾運輸的政策，似乎就再也不提了。
急迫需要激烈改革的農業，顯然是政府另外一個沒有意願去面對的領域，以免挑戰到大規模的（資本主義式的）農場的既得利益。儘管狂牛病（mad cow disease）以及不久前的口蹄疫（foot and mouth epidemic）危機又再一次發生──這場危機，最後屠殺了大約一千萬頭的牲畜（各方估計數量不同），導致去年一整年大部分鄉間的停滯發展。改革補助政策好能發展永續與有機農業的機會，新工黨政府顯然已經錯過了。
至於垃圾資源回收，政府再一次地進度緩慢而且謹慎，設定了一個沒有必要的超低標準（要在2006年達到25%的回收率），於是繼續依賴焚化爐來處理垃圾──而這又導致地方的反對與抗爭。
四、反對與另類出路
在英國歷史上，工黨只有兩次以國會實際多數而執政（一次是從1945年起，一次是從1966年起），──湯尼‧布萊爾之前最近的一次工黨政府，很快地在國會就淪為少數狀態，而必須依賴其它少數黨的支持。在1997年以前，工黨執政的時間加起來總共只有20年，而其中只有一半的時間是國會中是有效多數。因此，1997年與2001年連續兩次大選的勝利，並且贏得國會堅實的多數，還一度差點兒把保守黨消滅乾淨，這毫無疑問的是一項值得注意的政治成就。
成功具有一股巨大的吸引力（毫無疑問的，這也是為什麼每個地方的人都希望模仿新工黨經驗，或者至少認同它，以及和它相結合）。但是，新工黨政略（politics）裡的實質內容──對於持續進行的新自由主義全球化，幾乎不採取反抗──是沒有什麼吸引力的。
無論如何，新工黨選舉上的成功，很大程度上要歸因於保守黨本身的枯竭耗盡，換言之，它是拒斥保守主義的一個結果，也是大眾不肯投合「右翼」、「反歐洲主義」的結果，而不是對新工黨的一個正面背書。保守黨在政治光譜右翼的邊緣化，把「中間」的地盤讓給新工黨佔有，高唱所謂「中間英格蘭」（middle England）之類的論調。同時，英國的選舉制度在本質上就是設計給兩大政黨的，其它另類的聲音，例如像出自左派立場的，則大部分在選舉上是既聽不到也無從反映。
所以，反對新工黨的左翼可能浮現的機會在哪裡？自由民主黨，立基於中間階級的一個老政黨，他們現在發現，──或許對他們而言有些困惑──竟然會走向比新工黨還要左的路線。另外還有一個綠黨（the Green Party），雖是一個被英國選舉制度所抑制的政黨，但在一些小規模的地方選舉，成功地贏得選民信任，而在具有比例代表制的選舉裡，例如歐洲議會的選舉，綠黨就取得兩席歐洲議員，在蘇格蘭國會取得一席，在倫敦市議會則取得三席。還有更多傳統的左翼政黨，但是它們大多數都是小黨，也多屬宗派性質。已經有人開始嘗試，要把這些傳統左翼政黨整合起來，帶到比較自由一點以及多元主義式的綠黨左翼方向，不過，儘管我們盡了最大的努力，到目前為止，其進展相對來說還是很少，也很緩慢。
當然，也還有很廣泛的社會與環保運動，但是其中大多數都還純粹只是專業的遊說組織。更強調參與式與直接行動的團體，目前為止實力仍然薄弱並且侷限在地方活動。
因此從許多方面來看，工會，特別是那些公營部門的工會，或許是反對新工黨聯盟的立足點。
五、總結
讓我簡單回顧我所說過的，好作為總結。
第一，「第三條路」是奠基在歷史上社會民主的限制以及新右派的勝利上。它是左派大慘敗（a major defeat）的產品，而且是左派退縮後理性化的結果。毫不意外地，它在英國有一種特別強的迴響，因為英國左派的挫敗與退縮特別地明顯。
第二，「第三條路」所承諾的非敵對性與民主發展，最終地，這與資本範圍是無法共容的（雖然要強調的是「最終地」（ultimately）這個字）。同時，要在當前情況中把資本的範圍再度縮小的可能性，顯然也是有限的。
第三，假設我的講法是正確的，資本主義在未來不會有突然的崩潰。那麼要克服它，我們就必須要對新自由主義進行捍衛及日常的鬥爭，如此，一種另類的出路──國際主義且反資本主義的──的左翼政治將會出現。
（吳昱賢、邱毓斌 譯）
【注 釋】
1譯者註：英國「全民健康服務, NHS」的特色在於免收保費、醫療免費、公醫制度、財源完全來自稅收等等。自90年代以來，NHS日益惡化的服務品質成威英國政壇的辯論焦點。
2譯者註：此人為比利時歷史學家。
3許多工會領導人接續被判刑入獄，請見：Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, Capitalism Since World War II: The making and break up of the long boom, Fontana, London, 1984, p.418的討論。
4 請參考：Leo Panitch, ‘The New Imperial State’, New Left Review (II) 2, March/April 2000, p.8；這原則上是美國政府從中欺騙、利用的，彼得‧葛文（Peter Gowan）把它稱之為「美金–華爾街政權」（Dollar-Wall Street Regime）。請見：Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble, Verso, London, 1999.
5 譯者註：此人現在是義大利總理。
6 請見Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens, eds, On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism (2000), Vintage, London, 2001, p.43.
7 請見Alex Callinicos, ‘Social Theory Put to the Test of Politics: Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens’, New Left Review I/236, July-August 1999, p.84.
8請見Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.153.
9譯者註：伊斯璠‧梅思查羅思是匈牙利布達佩斯學派（以盧卡奇思想為主的新馬克思主義學派）的重要理論家。著有Philosophy, Ideology, and Social Science : Essays in Negation and Affirmation、Socialism or Barbarism、Beyond Capital : Toward a Theory of Transition等書。
10請見István Mészáros, Beyond Capital: Towards a theory of Transition, Merlin Press, London, 1995, p.41.
11請見Joel Kovel, The Enemy of Nature: The end of capitalism or the end of the world?, Zed Books, London and New York, 2002, p.21.
12請見Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, p.3.
13同見Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, p.43.
14譯者註：這是2002年5月2日哈特爾普﹝Hartlepool﹞鎮的地方選舉，有一個新工黨候選人自始至終都以該地一個足球俱樂部的吉祥物造型參選，這個球隊吉祥物是一隻名叫翁古（H'Angus）的猴子。這事實上是一個抗議新工黨黨中央的事件。這隻猴子身上還穿著鑲有紅玫瑰花邊的衣服，因為紅玫瑰是歐洲社會主義的象徵，在此代表工黨。當時並流傳一句話：在哈特爾普鎮，將投票給猴子，如果它穿著鑲有紅玫瑰花邊的衣服。最後，這位抗議新工黨的黨員當選了。
15見Matt Weaver, The Guardian, 13 March 2001。
16譯者註：英國工黨創於1899年，當時主要是由英國總工會（Trade Union Congress, TUC）以及部分左翼份子共同成立的。
17譯者註：RMT工會是英國鐵路（rail）、海運（maritime）、運輸（transport）三大交通部門的工會聯盟，全名是「全國鐵路、海運、運輸工人聯盟」（National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers）。詳情請參考此工會網站
http://www.rmt.org.uk/。
18譯者註：此人是桑斯伯利連鎖超市的總裁，自1996年起是新工黨最大的捐款者（他也曾是英國社會民主黨的重要捐助者），每次捐款都是以百萬英鎊計。儘管他的連鎖超市在英國有些地方受到居民反對而發起抗議運動，布萊爾還是滿支持他的。桑伯利超市集團除了經營超市之外，也投資食品工業，其中兩家是基因食品公司。新工黨在1998年執政時，任桑伯利勛爵為科學部部長（Government Minister for Science），新工黨的刊物，也是由他所贊助發行。
19譯者註：此人在1980年代是英國社會民主黨的重要金錢支持者，自1996年起改支持新工黨。他是Octopus出版集團（下轄至少8家大出版社）的總裁，也經營家庭錄影帶公司。1998年新工黨執政，獲封勛爵爵位。哈姆林勛爵已於2001年8月過逝。
20譯者註：此人原是保守黨的金援者，自2001年起，改支持新工黨，贊助額數也是都以百萬英鎊計。他本人是銀行總裁，擁有多家金融公司。
21譯者註：Railtrack於1994年成立，因為保守黨的鐵路私有化是採取車、路分別私有化，運輸部分移轉給多家私人公司，而鐵軌以及系統則由這家公司負責。Railtrack於2002年年初宣佈破產，新工黨政府被迫接管，但仍不願將之收歸國有。
────────────────
The Third Way and New Labour
Duncan Thompson
Introduction
The Third Way is notoriously difficult to pin down in any great detail. Anthony Giddens has at least made an attempt to sketch what he means by the term, though he has been accused of a certain vagueness, hiding behind meaningless phrases rather than confronting difficult issues. But if the Third Way is difficult to pin down in detail – with, not surprisingly, differences between those in the broadly Third Way camp - its general meaning is quite clear. It is an attempt by those historically of the centre-left to respond to the crisis of social democracy – Giddens’ The Third Way, published in 1998, was subtitled ‘the renewal of social democracy’ – and to develop what the proponents of the Third Way would define as a ‘progressive’ politics on the terrain of contemporary globalised capitalism.
What I want to do first of all is to situate the Third Way historically, by looking at the crisis of social democracy to which the Third Way is one particular response. Having sketched this bigger picture, I hope you will find it useful if I look at Britain in a little detail; trying to explain why talk of a Third Way – in the work of Anthony Giddens and others, and in the political practice of Tony Blair and New Labour – originated in Britain, what it amounts to in practice, and some of the opposition it has generated.
I. Situating the Third Way
i. The post-war settlement
So, to begin with, what was social democracy; or at least, what was social democracy in a western European context? I am, of course, going to simplify, to make some very broad generalisations, but for our purposes it may be defined if not exactly as equivalent to the post-war social and economic settlement in western Europe, then as at least the dominant political discourse on the terrain of that settlement. Historically grounded in the defeat of fascism, and what appeared to be the definitive discrediting of classical liberal capitalism by a generation of war and depression, the post-war settlement’s principal domestic components were an enhanced role for the state, bringing principal services (the establishment of the National Health Service) and strategic industries (the coal industry, the railways etc.) into public ownership, and Keynesian techniques of fiscal demand management. The role of the state in securing effective national economic management was crucially underpinned by the international framework of the Bretton Woods regime of managed exchange rates and capital controls.
The post-war settlement was not, of course, implemented everywhere in western Europe by the Left. Its origin in the progressive ‘moment’ of 1945 (victory over fascism) was soon overtaken by the moment of 1947: principal themes being Cold War anti-Communism and the defence of capitalism and Western imperialism (ongoing resistance to national liberation). Although the settlement was to a considerable extent based on the strength of organised labour, and, to a more limited extent, on the political success of the parties of the Left, and brought significant social gains to broad sections of the working class, it was a complex and ambiguous settlement, equally rooted in the anti-socialist politics of European Christian Democracy and, moreover, a response to the needs of capital. (Keynes himself was, of course, an anti-socialist, determined to save capitalism from its own anarchic excesses.) The laissez-faire of many competing capitals tends to periodic systemic crisis: better that some order be brought to the ‘anarchy’ of capitalist production and exchange in the general interest of capital as a whole; perhaps no more than a necessary swing of the pendulum from, in Henri Pirenne’s words, a cycle of ‘economic freedom’ to one of corrective ‘economic regulation’. The settlement was sustained in western Europe by the long post-war boom, which appeared to have successfully brought an end to the periodic recessions that had been so marked and debilitating a feature of the crisis-prone capitalism of the recent past, simultaneously keeping both capital profitable and labour content. In Eric Hobsbawm’s words, there was a ‘golden age’ of prosperity.
However, it was the Left which was the more closely identified with, and, over time, apparent beneficiary of, these changes. Industrialisation and urbanisation swelled the ranks of the working class, won new recruits to the trade unions, and widened the electoral base of the parties of the Left. By the mid-seventies social democratic parties were in government in all the countries of northern Europe.
ii. The Crisis of Social Democracy
The compromise character and inherent instability of the post-war settlement was revealed as soon as the particular conditions which sustained it were threatened with the passing of the long boom from the late sixties. Profits were being squeezed, productivity was not rising sufficiently, and Keynesian techniques of economic stimulation were floored by ‘stagflation’: the simultaneous impact of slump and inflation. Moreover, the international framework of the Bretton Woods agreement was beginning to unravel, with the decision of the Nixon government in the USA to take the dollar off the gold standard, subsequent currency instability, and the growth of speculative financial markets.
The crisis of the post-war settlement induced a sharp political polarisation. The broad consensus between centre-left and centre-right broke down. The position of the Left, however, appeared strong. The institutional strength of labour in the advanced capitalist countries seemed to be well entrenched, and a platform for further progress won. The end of the long post-war boom in western Europe was initially marked by the great strike-waves of the late sixties and early seventies (the French May, Italian hot autumn, etc.), and the Left, enjoying a greater degree of unity than at any time since the onset of the Cold War (and responding to wider social discontents), underwent a certain degree of radicalisation. Revolution shook Portugal, while dictatorships also fell in Spain and Greece. The mass Communist parties of France and Italy grew in strength, promising the election of Union of the Left style governments potentially more radical than their social democratic counterparts in northern Europe.
But while some sought a transition to a more advanced form of social democracy or even socialism (the French Left, for example, spoke of a ‘rupture with capitalism’; the Swedish Social Democrats proposed gradualist socialisation via the Meidner Plan; and in Britain the Labour Left tabled its ‘alternative economic strategy’), the beneficiaries of the crisis proved to be a neo-liberal New Right, advocating an abandonment of the post-war Keynesian settlement in favour of ‘freeing’ capital from the restraining hand of the state and its fiscal policies. The Left, too closely identified with the old order, was ultimately unable to meet the challenge of a radicalised Right.
iii. The triumph of the New Right
The full story of the triumph of the New Right is far too long and complex too go into here. Suffice to say that neo-liberal globalisation was, and continues to be, driven by capitalism’s inherent tendency to concentration, universalisation and technological innovation, spurred by the determination of the New Right to reverse the domestic gains of the post-war settlement and to reassert the global dominance of Western capitalism.
Labour was weakened by mass unemployment and a new aggressiveness on the part of capital (backed by the state); the trade unions suffering seminal strike defeats, such as that at FIAT in Italy in 1980; the firing of the entire 11,000 membership of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers’ Organisation in the USA in 1981 (with Union leaders being ‘hustled to gaol in chains’: Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, Capitalism Since World War II: The making and break up of the long boom, Fontana, London, 1984, p.418); and the defeat of the year-long miners strike in Britain, 1984-5.
The geo-political and ideological triumph of West in the Cold War (the revolutions of 1989, the fall of the Soviet Union 1991) led some to talk of the ‘end of history’, while the reassertion of Western dominance over the global South through IMF-World Bank ‘structural adjustment’ cemented what Leo Panitch refers to as the ‘new era of imperial neo-liberalism’ (Leo Panitch, ‘The New Imperial State’, New Left Review (II) 2, March/April 2000, p.8; principally imposed by the US government through what Peter Gowan calls the ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’: Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble, Verso, London, 1999).
In sum, the New Right’s assault, decisively strengthening the domestic and international hand of capital in relation to labour, resulted in a major setback and defeat for the Left. Where the rejuvenated Left of the seventies had contemplated a transition beyond capitalism, the chastened leaderships of the centre-left parties and trade unions of the eighties and nineties entertained only a most minimalist ‘realism’ – i.e., extolling the triumph of the market and tabling only such policies as could be comfortably accommodated within the existing capitalist order. It was the abandonment of its originally progressive programme by the Mitterrand government in France in 1981-3, under Washington orchestrated international speculative pressure, that seemed to seal the fate of the Left’s hopes of a leftist resolution to the crisis of the post-war settlement.
iv. British particularity
We’ve looked, admittedly very briefly and sketchily, at the crisis of social democracy and triumph of the New Right. The detail on the ground is, of course, enormously varied. Each country will have experienced, and will continue to experience, these changes differently, reflecting their place in the global economic hierarchy and all the complexities of distinct national histories and cultures. While the appeal of the Third Way is international - Giddens original book, for example, has been translated into 25 languages - I do not think it a coincidence that it was initiated in Britain, either as an ideological discourse by Giddens, or as a political practice with the advent of New Labour under Tony Blair.
The political fall-out from the crisis of the Keynesian-inspired post-war settlement was particularly sharp in Britain. Margaret Thatcher, who came to power in 1979, was one of the most strident advocates of the New Right. The Conservative Party under her leadership followed its 1979 success by winning large parliamentary majorities at successive elections in 1983 and 1987, and again under the leadership of John Major in 1992. However, they never won more than around 43% of the vote – their success apparently dependent on a divided opposition, for the fierce struggle over the future of the Labour Party after 1979 resulted in the formation of a new party (the Social Democratic Party, the SDP) who, in alliance with the established party of the middle-ground – the Liberals – effectively captured the centre of the political spectrum. The non-proportional British electoral system thus allowed the Conservatives to win against a divided opposition. Thus long before the Third Way or New Labour, there were influential voices advocating a realignment of the centre-left to recapture the middle-ground, reuniting Labour and the Liberals as part of a progressive coalition of the ‘radical centre’, a realignment that would naturally involve ditching any commitment, however distant, to socialism.
The Left suffered serious defeat in this period. Thatcher abolished oppositional local governments, ending experiments in developing a progressive Left-Labour politics. The head-on confrontation with the miners in a year-long strike (1984-5) and anti-trade union legislation decisively weakened the trade unions. Each electoral defeat pushed the Labour Party further to the right, ‘modernisation’ of the party emptying it of its democratic content, and resulting in a presidential style of leadership. The influence of the Left, so strong in the early eighties, was all but eliminated. The symbolic commitment, enshrined in Clause Four of the party’s constitution, to the ‘common ownership of the means of production’, was finally dropped in 1995 (replaced with some suitably vague commitments, and an endorsement of ‘the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition’). Tony Blair, meanwhile, unilaterally renamed the Labour Party ‘New Labour’. The nature of the electoral system precluded the formation of an independent Left, and the trade unions and others remained committed to Labour as the only electoral alternative to the Conservatives – the move to the right onto the terrain of Thatcherite neo-liberalism seemingly excusable as the only means of recapturing an electoral majority large enough to unseat the Conservatives from power.
Thus, even aside from the ideological and geo-political triumph of the capitalist West over Communist East with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the deepening globalisation of the capitalist world economy throughout this period, the Left was weaker in Britain than in otherwise broadly comparable countries. In neighbouring France, for example, the Left’s electoral victory in 1997 was preceded by a massive popular mobilisation led by the public sector trade unions in the winter of 1994-5 against projected social expenditure reform. For all its manifest limitations, the now fallen Jospin government was never as crusadingly neo-liberal as Blair, and whatever Jospin’s preferred course, he was at least held somewhat in check by the electoral strength of his left-wing coalition partners, the Communists and the Greens.
v. Situating New Labour
Now is far too early to offer a conclusion, but what I want to do here is to suggest is that situating the Third Way does not make sense other than grounded in this wider history. It is, I would argue, an attempt to lend an ideological gloss to ‘minimalist realism’, i.e., to those once on the centre-left, such as New Labour, busy accommodating to the narrow margin of manoeuvre available within the constraints of neo-liberal globalisation - more pronounced in Britain than elsewhere (certainly than in western Europe) given the trauma of five successive electoral defeats, the weakness of labour (and the trade unions), and the apparent ideological ascendancy of Thatcherite individualism. The fact that what constitutes the Third Way is the work of a few intellectuals - there is no Third Way ‘movement’ – is, I think, symptomatic of a vacuum, an emptiness, at the heart of a centre-left. It is a response to, and rationalisation of, the major defeats suffered by the Left in this period.
In Britain, the whole political spectrum has moved to the right over the past twenty years. Someone once joked that merely to stand still, to hold a consistent political position, for 6 months was to up on the left! Roy Hattersley, deputy leader to Neil Kinnock 1983-92, and originally a figure associated with the right of the Labour Party, is one of those rare individuals to have maintained a consistent politics, and so now ends up as a left-wing critic of New Labour.
New Labour is obsessed with the term ‘new’, anything they judge good is almost automatically prefixed ‘new’, while all obstacles, whether from left or right, are ‘old’ or ‘conservative’. (In this sense they judge left politics, trade unions and the public sector ‘conservative’.) What this obsession with novelty, with ‘modernisation’, amounts to is, in essence, running with grain of capitalist globlisation.
Let us take, by way of example, the promotion of a ‘flexible labour market’.
Given that the whole political spectrum in Britain has moved to the right, comparisons with western Europe are particularly instructive in placing Blair and New Labour politically. One key aspect of neo-liberal globalisation is the question of a ‘flexible labour market’ – i.e., how easy it is to sack workers, restrict employment rights, pay low wages etc. Britain is some way down the road towards a ‘flexible labour market’, moving to an American style low-wage economy, where unemployment has fallen but where the numbers of working poor have risen. There is considerable opposition to such moves elsewhere in Europe, with Blair openly lining up with Berlusconi (of Italy) - tainted with corruption, in coalition with neo-fascist and openly racist parties - and Aznar (of Spain), the most right-wing of the European leaders. There have been major demonstrations and one-day general strikes in both Italy and Spain earlier this year – strikes, it is worth noting, that would have been illegal in Britain under Conservative anti-trade union legislation that the Blair government shows no sign of repealing. In embracing key aspects of neo-liberal globalisation, Blair has demonstrated that he is to the right of mainstream centre-Right Christian Democracy.
II. Towards a Red-Green critique of the Third Way
i. The ultimate uncontrollability of capitalism
I’ve been using the terms Third Way and New Labour interchangeably – this is not entirely fair. Within the narrow spectrum of New Labour, I think we could safely place Giddens somewhat to the ‘left’, a little disappointed in the performance of New Labour. And although Giddens is the best known of the thinkers in the Third Way camp, there are others, notably Will Hutton, editor of The Observer and author of the broadly Third Way The State We’re In (1995), who are much more critical of the Blair government and the effects of globalisation. Hutton, for example, denounced the Blair-Schröder paper presented in 1999 as ‘an astonishing statement of neo-liberal principles’ (Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens, eds, On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism (2000), Vintage, London, 2001, p.43).
My reason for lumping these people together is that the whole concept of a progressive Third Way, however defined in detail, shares a belief that the world’s enormous social and environmental problems can be tackled within its own self-imposed limits; i.e., within the confines of capitalism, judging capitalism in effect a ‘second nature’, ‘the inescapable horizon of social life in the modern world’ (Alex Callinicos, ‘Social Theory Put to the Test of Politics: Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens’, New Left Review I/236, July-August 1999, p.84). It fails to acknowledge the inherently antagonistic character of capitalism. Instead it promotes the myth of a ‘community’, of common purpose, where none in fact exists. There is thus a large measure of wishful thinking – or is it mere pretence? – from those associated with the Third Way. Giddens, for example, advocates that capitalists should act ‘responsibly’, (Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.153) whereas in reality no single individual, nor any single corporation, however powerful, can act other than as dictated to by market forces.
Before we go any further, let’s just briefly remind ourselves that from our Red-Green perspective capitalism is the problem. Why? Because, in the words of István Mészáros, capitalism is ‘an ultimately uncontrollable mode of social metabolic control’ (István Mészáros, Beyond Capital: Towards a theory of Transition, Merlin Press, London, 1995, p.41), not only creating untold social dislocation but now, fundamentally, threatening the ecology of the planet itself.
‘A successful market economy generates far greater prosperity than any rival system’ (Giddens, 2000, p.35) … yes indeed, along with a great deal of environmental destruction, now reaching the point where the ‘buffering capacity’ (Joel Kovel, The Enemy of Nature: The end of capitalism or the end of the world?, Zed Books, London and New York, 2002, p.21) of the planet is exceeded. The point is that capitalism, even if it knew when to stop, simply can’t. It must grow or die. Capital is not amenable to control, uncontrollablity is of its very essence.
Thus while I would accept, with Giddens, that ‘Economic globalisation … is a reality’, it does not follow, as Giddens charges, that therefore socialism ‘is no more’ (Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, p.3), that ‘No one any longer has any alternatives to capitalism’ (ibid., p.43). Accepting the altered terrain of contemporary capitalism changes nothing fundamental about the character of capitalism. On the contrary, it makes finding an alternative more pressing. What it requires is that we think through the prospects of an anti-capitalist politics in the era of globalisation. This is, of course, a huge, huge question, and fortunately not something we need to go into in this paper!
It is enough to say that the fundamental uncontrollability of capital ultimately invalidates any ‘Third Way’. At best, the Third Way promises improvements that cannot be fully realised within the logic capital, at worst it is exposed as no more then a fig-leaf of respectability to hide what in practice is an acquiescence to neo-liberal globalisation. The Third Way denies the possibility of an alternative to capitalism, and sows illusions in the perfectibility of capitalism through reform. The real choice remains ‘socialism or barbarism’.
ii. The limits of reform
Now much, of course, hangs on the word ‘ultimately’. Discounting any Big Bang end to capitalism, it is obvious that there are various possible different capitalisms this side of socialism or barbarism. Surely we should pursue reforms that tame capitalism, that build democratic and counter-veiling institutions as a means of strengthening those social forces that can ultimately overturn capital? If reform comes up against the barriers of capital, is it not possible to push back those barriers, to establish regulatory governance? Was this not, after all, the achievement of post-war social democracy? One way to make capitalists act ‘responsibly’ would be through strengthening regulatory frameworks. Will Hutton – though not, it should be noted, Giddens – favourably contrasts the ‘managed capitalism’ of continental Europe and East Asia, subordinating the speculative drive of commercial capital to the longer-term needs of productive capital, to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of shareholder capitalism.
Let us take these two key questions, regulation and democracy, in turn.
The fractions of capital with whom, historically, social democracy has always been better able to do deal with are largely national scale firms, capital intensive and more geographically embedded, preferring a greater measure of long-term security (and, no doubt, oligarchic restrictions on competition). However, the dominant fractions of capital today are more footloose. The enormous growth of financial markets has led to the dominance of speculative over productive capital; though even manufacturing, with its network of short-term subcontracting is itself no longer as nationally-embedded as in the past. Meanwhile, the ideological triumph of ‘free enterprise’ and ‘free trade’ has weakened the commitment to regulation, even where it would benefit particular fractions of industrial capital. Moreover, labour, the principal social force behind any reconstituted regulatory or social democratic regime, is more internally divided (along lines of profession, skill, age, gender, race, etc.) than in its recent past even at a national, let alone a global, level. Thus, any Third Way ‘renewal’ of social democracy will reflect today’s less favourable balance of social forces globally – i.e., the reconfiguration and aggression of capital, and the strength of capital to labour. The tendency, abetted if not entirely engineered by Washington, is towards a continued undermining of forms of economic governance and towards a world economy with fewer and fewer restraints upon the destructive and short-term interests of capital. The very bodies that might enact economic governance, such as the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, are in fact driving neo-liberalism globalisation. The fundamental weakness of the Third Way is demonstrated in its failure to analyse precisely which social forces have the capacity to impose restraint on capital.
There are, however, some grounds for optimism. Despite neo-liberalism’s ideological onslaught, popularly held social democratic values – for example, the defence of the public sector against privatisation, especially with regard to health and education - have been hard to dislodge, and as illusions in the Third Way rhetoric of the leaderships of parties of the centre-Left are exposed, one may hope that it will become clearer that the defence (let alone improvement) of social and environmental standards is incompatible with the demands of the dominant fractions of contemporary capitalism. If re-enacting a social democratic settlement at the national or even regional level is now harder to achieve given the transformation of capitalism over the past quarter of a century, this points, potentially, to a certain radicalisation on the Left, for as the space for old-style social democracy visibly shrinks, the choice lies between an outright acquiescence to the neo-liberal order (the Third Way) or a stronger commitment to a more explicitly, and inevitably internationalist, anti-capitalist politics.
III. The political practice of New Labour
That’s how I see the bigger picture. Before concluding, I’d like to talk a little about Britain in more detail, and the record of New Labour in government, taking the examples of democratic reform, of New Labour’s relations with the labour movement, and its record on the environment.
i. New Labour and democracy
For Giddens, democratic reform is judged an essential glue of ‘social inclusion’ in a world of increased ‘risk’ and a greater individualism. And for New Labour, long overdue constitutional reform was a central plank of its programme, lending it a touch of radicalism, chiming with demands of the political ‘centre’ (the Liberals, Charter 88 etc.). New Labour’s record in office is, however, patchy at best – putting unnecessary last minute obstacles in the way of long promised commitments to a Scottish parliament and Welsh Assembly (though these were duly secured by referenda early in Labour’s first-term); ensuring that any democratic element in a reformed House of Lords will be kept to a minimum; all but abandoning the prospect that electoral reform will advance the cause of proportional representation; while gimmicks such as directly elected mayors have been mostly resisted (and where implemented such elections proving embarrassments to the government, not least the election of a man in a monkey-suit promising free bananas to schoolchildren in the town of Hartlepool, in north-east England!). Incidentally, New Labour’s reflex of centralising control – control-freakery - back-fired spectacularly in its handling of elections to the leadership of the Welsh Assembly and in the contest for London’s first directly-elected mayor: effectively ending the political careers of the two Blairite candidates in the process.
Turn-out at elections continues to fall, just 59% at the last national election in 2001; 23% at the nation-wide European elections of 1999. Why? Because, fundamentally, as the centre-left now espouses neo-liberalism, there really isn’t much choice. Nothing better demonstrates the emptiness of New Labour than the popular view that there really isn’t much to choose between the principal parties. Traditional Labour voters tend to stay at home on polling day – making abstention one of the biggest electoral threats to New Labour.
More importantly, and perhaps needless to say, no-one from the ranks of the Third Way or New Labour are going to suggest the introduction of democracy where it is most meaningful, namely in economic decision-making. Democracy is only permitted where it poses no threat to capital. For that very reason, extending and deepening democracy is an important challenge to capital, and a renewed Left politics must find ways of encouraging genuine participation, especially in a more independent local and regional government; in policy-making and administration in the public sector; and in the development of a ‘Third Sector’ social economy.
ii. New Labour and the labour movement
Perhaps the single most sensitive political issue in Britain is privatisation (not least because it was a key element in Thatcher’s anti-socialist crusade). Moreover it is an issue that is threatening to bring New Labour into confrontation with the labour movement. After the major selling off of nationalised industries, privatisation now takes the form of what are called ‘public-private partnerships’ (PPPs) – covering a variety of arrangements that encourage the private sector to take control of public services. The most contentious, and most profitable of such arrangements to private business, are known as ‘private finance initiatives’ (PFIs), introduced in 1992. Professor Allyson Pollock, chair of the health and services research unit at University College London and a fierce critic of PFI, has termed them a (£30 billion) ‘gold rush’.
PFIs are complex, but, in simple terms, private firms, or usually consortium consisting of several firms, are paid to run aspects of public sector work – including major infrastructural projects such as new hospitals and the projected refurbishment and running of the London Underground. There are, of course, numerous problems with all this – not least contractors cutting corners in terms of safety, pay and working conditions etc., which have been the main grounds for trade union opposition, given the illegality under current legislation of trade unions tackling the wider issue of privatisation as such.
The only obvious benefit to the government is that by going to the private sector for the initial money to pay for these projects it will not appear on the government’s balance sheet as borrowing and, therefore, not add to the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), now Public Sector Net Cash Requirement (PSNCR) – itself an unnecessarily onerous form of government accounting: alternative forms of accounting are advocated by opponents of privatisation (such as General Government Financial Deficit, or GGFD). But higher costs are incurred long-term, not least through the ‘preferred bidder’ being able to add substantially to estimated costs after competitive tendering has closed. It has been estimated, for example, that the average PFI hospital, costing the same as a publicly-financed hospital, ends up with an average of 30% fewer beds (Matt Weaver, The Guardian, 13 March 2001). A simple, and much better, alternative would be to raise the necessary funds through borrowing or by issuing government or public sector bonds. Not the least of the criticisms made of PFIs is their lack of accountability, denying the most minimal of democratic scrutiny under cover of ‘commercial confidentiality’ (an example of the erosion of democracy).
A second bone of contention between the trade unions and New Labour is the government’s failure to repeal anti-trade union legislation, the most draconian in western Europe, imposed by the Conservatives in the eighties and nineties. Indeed, when pressed, Blair seems rather proud that Britain has the most restrictive trade union legislation in western Europe. The United Campaign to Repeal the Anti Trade Union Laws was founded in 1998, within a year of New Labour coming to office. However, the cause has arguably less popular support than the issue of privatisation, and moderate and pro-New Labour trade union leaders are unwilling to back the campaign.
Above all, it is the continuing programme of privatisation that threatens to bring the historic links of the trade unions to the Labour Party into question.
The trade unions, of course, founded the Labour Party, and have until very recently been its principal backers. Up until the 1980s, some 90% of the Labour Party’s funds came from the trade unions; by 1995 this had fallen to 50%; while the 1999 party accounts revealed that the figure was down to just 30%. The fall has been a consequence of the party’s ability to get funding from elsewhere, la
