China is out of step with these developments. It still views President Chen Shui-bian as an aberration, as if removing him from office will turn back the clock and roll forth the forces of reunification. Yet Taiwan's clear democratic desire today is to eschew the embrace of the motherland. To Beijing, therefore, the KMT's conversion—genuine or
not—is a surprising, and potentially disastrous, development. Though the Communists and Nationalists were adversaries, they at least shared the same goal: reunification of China and Taiwan. Not anymore. The KMT is now, at best, the party of the status quo, well aware that plumping for closer ties with China is a sure vote loser. "The issue of reunification cannot be answered at this time," Lien Chan told Time in a recent interview. "The interests of Taiwan must be considered first." This means Beijing is in a bind even if Lien is victorious. "The Chinese leadership had expected Chen Shui-bian to try to win the election by opposing reunification," says an adviser to the mainland's Foreign Ministry. "But it's deeply concerned to see the KMT following suit." Says National Taiwan University political scientist Lee: "The only two ideologies in Taiwan now are independence and the status quo—ification is dead."
>
中國已經完全跟不上這些腳步，他們仍然視陳水扁總統為一個偏離正軌的人，好像把他從總統府趕走就可以讓所有的事情回到原點、回到統一的路上。但是台灣的民主意志正往偏離他的「祖國」路上走。對北京而言，國民黨的轉變令其驚訝的潛在災難。雖然共產黨和國民黨曾經是敵人，但是他們以前至少同樣的分享一個統一的大夢。這個大夢已經不在了。現在的國民黨頂多算是主張維持現狀的政黨，他們很明瞭和中國的關連太近會讓他們失去選票。連戰在最近一次的訪談中，告訴時代的記者「統一這個問題現在無法回答，台灣的利益應該優先被考慮」。這代表即使連戰當選北京仍然是被綁手綁腳。中共外交部的官員說：「中國領導人已經對陳水扁會用反對統一的手段來打選戰有心理準備」。台灣大學的李姓社會科學家說：「但是他們沒想到國民黨會用同樣的招數，台灣現在的意志只有兩種：獨立或維持現狀，統一已經不存在了。」
>
China has made no secret of its anxiety about the election. When the National People's Congress opened in Beijing last week, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated his offer to hold talks with Taipei if it accepts the "one China" principle, but he emphasized that "we stand firmly opposed to any form of separatist activities aimed at Taiwan dependence and will never allow anyone to split Taiwan from China by any means." But the Chinese leadership doesn't know how to blunt Taiwan's growing sense of its own identity. In the past, it tried to cow Taipei by hurling invective, or—in 1996—by launching missiles into the Taiwan Strait. But during the last presidential election in 2000, Beijing's bluster backfired, helping Chen win office by making him seem like a plucky hero willing to confront the playground bully. Since then, China has been exerting its economic rather than military muscle. In a bid to win over the island's business community—which prevalently favors the political status quo but closer economic ties with the mainland—Beijing has welcomed investment from Taiwan and pushed for direct transport links. It has also lobbied governments that have influence over Taipei, such as the U.S. and French, to tell Chen to cool it. This approach has yielded some dividends for China. In December, President George W. Bush emerged from a 40-minute White House meeting with Premier Wen and declared that the U.S. opposes any move by Chen that unilaterally changes the status quo—a neat irony, given America's simultaneous enthusiasm for bringing democracy to Iraq. The following month, when Chinese President Hu Jintao was in Paris, his French counterpart Jacques Chirac joined the chorus of China well-wishers, and he called Taiwan's referendum a "grave mistake."
>
中國從來沒有隱藏過他們對於選戰的焦慮，當中國人民大會上禮拜在北京開會時，總理溫家寶重申，如果台北接受「一個中國」的觀念，他們可以重新展開對話，他也說：「我們堅定的反對任何將台灣分離中國的手段，也絕對不容許任何人將台灣分離中國」但是中國領導者並不知道如何讓台灣意識消失。在過去，他們曾經用謾罵、或用飛彈試射到台灣海峽來讓台灣人膽怯，但是在上次總統大選，北京的恐嚇反而造成反效果，這些恐嚇讓陳水扁贏了選戰，因為它們讓陳水扁看起來像是一個抵禦外侮的英雄。從那時候開始，中國開使用經濟手段來取代軍事手段。為了贏得台灣生意人的支持(這些人大多贊成政治上維持現狀，經濟上拉近和中國的關係)，北京歡迎從台灣來的投資、並開始推動直接通航。北京並影響對台灣政府有影響力的外國政府（例如：美國、法國）來警告陳水扁。這些手段似乎達到某些效果，布希政府在和溫總理四十分鐘的會談後，宣告美國反對任何陳水扁單邊改變現狀的舉動（一個諷刺的聲明，尤其當美國同時熱中於將民主帶到伊拉克）。此後一個月，當中國國家主席胡錦濤訪問法國時，法國總統席拉克加入了『中國希望合唱曲』中，發表了「台灣的公投是一個致命的錯誤」
>
But even international pressure is not as effective as it used to be, not least because as Taiwan becomes a more mature democracy, its leaders—whether from the DPP or the KMT—must increasingly heed the views and needs of the majority of the electorate. With the "one country, two systems" model looking more and more unacceptable, China's best bet of cajoling Taiwan into submission might be the rich promise of economic integration. Yet even as Taiwan investment in China has swelled to a cumulative total of some $100 billion by some estimates, independence sentiment rises. A more flexible Beijing might try to offer additional sweeteners to Taipei. A foreign-policy expert in the Chinese capital suggests, for instance, allowing Taiwan to join some international institutions such as the WHO. This election "should be an overdue chance to adjust Taiwan policy," he says, "but that's not happening."
>
>
但是，國際壓力並沒有像以往般的有效，因為當台灣的民主越來越成熟時，他的領導者（不管是民進黨、或是國民黨）就必須要傾聽人民的聲音、需要。當「一國兩制」的架構越來越不能接受，中國最有效的方案只能靠經濟整合。然而，及使台灣在中國的總投資超過千億美元，獨立的傾向卻是越來越明顯。身段要更軟化的北京可能會讓台北試試其他的甜頭。例如：一個在北京的外國關係專家就建議讓台灣加入一些國際組織（如國際衛生組織）。他說：「這個選舉可能是一個改變對台灣策略的契機，但是，這個政策改變卻沒有發生。」
>
Instead, Beijing can only hope that the KMT wins—and ready its military so that it has an alternative means of ensuring that the independence movement doesn't go too far. Beijing has never ruled out retaking Taiwan by force, and years of double-digit growth in the mainland's defense spending have finally made this a feasible strategy. By settling almost all their border disputes, China's leaders can now target the country's military investment on two goals: attacking Taiwan, and deterring U.S. involvement in the conflict. Over the past 18 months, observers have detected a sharp uptick in China's military shipbuilding, especially of submarines and of amphibious landing craft capable of ferrying 400 soldiers and 30 tanks across the rough Taiwan Strait. Even more important is new technology to target U.S. aircraft carriers based in Japan. Defense experts believe China is still a decade away from being able to land troops on Taiwan's fortified shores. Nonetheless, says a Western diplomat in Beijing, "for the first time China's political leaders are at the point of having a credible military option."
>
所以，北京只能希望國民黨能贏了這場選舉，並且準備好武力來確保台灣獨立運動不會走得太過火。北京從不曾排除對台灣動武，它們每年的軍事費用是百分之十幾以上的成長，而現在大陸終於有可行攻台策略。在確保鄰國不會侵犯後，中國領者人可以讓這個國家的軍備力量集中在兩件事情上：攻擊台灣，以及拖延美國介入。在過去的十八個月，觀察家發現中國的軍事設備有極大的進展，特別是潛水艇以及可以載運四百名軍人、三十輛坦克跨過台灣海峽的兩棲登陸艦艇。中國更重要的目標，是能夠攻擊美軍日本基地航空母艦的科技。國防專家相信距離中國真正有能力攻台的時間應該還有十年，但是，一個在中國的西方戰略家說：「中國領導者是第一次有足以信賴的軍事手段（來攻台）」。
>
China is unlikely, of course, to attack Taiwan militarily—Beijing would have too much to lose. But by showing that it has the capability to do so, it hopes to chill Taiwan's independence movement. Such brinkmanship won't work if the southern village of Tungkang is any barometer. TV celebrity Wang Ben-hu is winding down his show, but the audience is still charged. The crowd becomes so emotional that security guards muscle in to try to calm people down. An old man seated in the front row, no longer able to contain his feelings, rises to his feet and shouts, "China is China. Taiwan is Taiwan." For the first time in history, perhaps, that is something that Beijing—and the rest of the world—might have to come to terms with.
>
當然，中國是不太可能攻台，如果攻台北京的的損失會更大。但是，藉著展現他們攻台的能力，他們希望可以能台灣的獨立運動冷卻。但是，這種危險策略在這個東港的小魚村起不了什麼作用。電視明星汪笨湖正在讓他的節目降溫，但是現場觀眾依然很熱情。觀眾熱情到要讓警衛介入才能讓人民冷靜下來，一個坐在前排座位、再也不能控制他的情感的老人站起來大叫：「中國是中國，台灣是台灣。」也許，這個口號是中國以及世界其他的國家要開始需要深思、體會的。
>
文章定位：
