La Vita è Bella Life is Beautiful. La Vita es Bonita. 美麗人生　

242愛的鼓勵 7訂閱站台

當我在報上看到中國摩根大通公司董事總經理對中國的房地產價格不斷上漲的說法時（如下），心想這位女銀行家雖然提出種種數據來強化其論點，但是她是否了解八零年代日本與台灣的泡沫經濟呢？

中國房地產市場或許漲幅偏高，但真的沒有泡沫化的危機嗎？中國家庭債務約占國內生產毛額遠低於美國及歐洲。這點我雖然沒有確切的數據，但是我相信八零年代的日本與台灣也是如此。抵押購房者的最低自付款比例，與家庭的儲蓄率，八零年代的日本與台灣也大幅高過美國。但是在這種經濟條件下，台灣與日本都發生了泡沫經濟。唯一一點不同的是：台幣與日圓在這段期間都大幅升值，但是人民幣沒有。

今天又在紐約時報讀到克魯格曼（Paul Krugman）的專欄，談的是愛爾蘭的金融危機。然而愛爾蘭與美國同樣面臨了金融危機，但是在美國造成金融危機了主要因素，幾乎都不存在愛爾蘭：沒有社區再投資法案(Community Reinvestment Act)，沒有房利美(Fannie Mae)，沒有房地美(Freddie Mac)，既無信用違約交換(credit default swap)的衍生性金融商品，也非債務擔保證劵(collateralized debt obligation)所造成。兩者最大的共同點是：房地產價格飛漲！

看看中國摩根大通公司董事總經理李晶的說法：房價飆「是激情 不是泡沫」，深深覺得克魯格曼（Paul Krugman）在文中所說的："let bankers do what they want is a recipe for disaster."真是有道理！

中國沿海各省缺工，雖然許多官方的說法把原因歸為一胎化政策之下，勞動力的成長大幅減少。但是我想沿海各大城市驚人的通貨膨脹才是嚇跑民工的主因。我許多在中國工作的朋友，在房地產上賺了不少錢。不到五年的時間，個個從一般上班族的有節制消費，到現在出手闊綽，搬到高級住宅區，買雙B或L牌名車。連這樣的人都會在閒談時說道這幾個城市的消費不亞於台北了，那一年賺不到十萬台幣的民工又怎能生活呢？

那麼，或許現在中國與八零年代的日本與台灣唯一一點不同也正在悄悄改變－－人民幣也要升值。
1. 一年期人民幣的價格已經上漲。
2. 不少經濟學家認為中國會適度讓人民幣升值來抑制通貨膨脹。

那麼，台灣呢？房市屢創新高，股市也持續加溫，看來中長期台幣也會升值。

remarks:
英文詞彙: collateralized debt obligation（CDO)
中文詞彙: 債務抵押債券；擔保債權憑證

房價飆「是激情 不是泡沫」
2010/3/7
【聯合晚報╱編譯陳澄和╱綜合報導】

中國房地產泡沫問題最近引起國際間的廣泛關注，但中國摩根大通公司董事總經理李晶指出，中國房地產的本質與美國市場迴異，中國房地產市場或許漲幅偏高，但並沒有泡沫化的危機。

李晶在華爾街日報中文網發表的文章中說，中國部分大型城市的房價虛高，以及銀行貸款引導不當而流入樓市，確實對去年的房價大幅上漲有推波助瀾的作用。然而，中國與美國房地產市場存在著重要差異，在美國可以解讀為泡沫的現象，在中國可能只是一種可以控制的過度激情。

她說，美國次級房貸危機種因於家庭貸款劇增，中國家庭債務約占國內生產毛額 (GDP)的17%，遠低於美國的96% 及歐洲的62%。近年來，中國家庭的債務水準雖然上升，但仍是從極低的基礎上竄。

就住宅市場而言，在中國，抵押購房者的最低首付款比例為30%，而二次購房者則為40%。即使在政府推行刺激政策期間，首次購房者的最低首付比例也僅下調至20%。中國人向來有不願負債的文化傳統，所以很多購房者的首付款都遠超過最低要求。另外，中國家庭也累積了大量儲蓄；而在次貸危機爆發之前的幾年，美國家庭的儲蓄率根本不及1%。

李晶表示，中國住宅市場的價格漲幅雖然過大，2009年時更超過20%，但看待這些數據時不應脫離收入成長的整體趨勢。過去五年，城市家庭收入的年複合成長率為13.2%，房價的年複合成長率則為11.9%。

商用不動產也引發眾多憂慮。2009年，商用物業的價格上漲16%，但北京、上海兩地的租金收益偏低，且甲級寫字樓的空置率分別高達21%及14%。然而，甲級物業的佔用率及租金水平已開始回升；而目前存在高空置率問題的商用物業當中，大部分乃是較低端的物業。而且，中國的城市化還有很大的發展空間，假以時日，空置的辦公室自會逐步消化。

中國的房地產問題的根源在於中國存款利率偏低，而投資選擇有限，因此投資階層將房地產視為保值手段。此外，中國未推出物業持有稅，投機性購房者普遍希望在不久的將來獲得資本升值，而忽略租金收益。李晶表示，即使房地產市場經歷調整，也不會引發舉債過度國家遭遇的經濟及財政動盪。

李晶結論說，過度舉債和抵押房貸證券化是美國次貸危機的罪魁禍首，而中國並不存在這兩方面的問題。


中國摩根大通公司董事總經理李晶。 新華社

http://money.udn.com/house/storypage.jsp?f_MAIN_ID=415&f_SUB_ID=4079&f_ART_ID=206132




Op-Ed Columnist

An Irish Mirror


By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: March 7, 2010

Everyone has a theory about the financial crisis. These theories range from the absurd to the plausible — from claims that liberal Democrats somehow forced banks to lend to the undeserving poor (even though Republicans controlled Congress) to the belief that exotic financial instruments fostered confusion and fraud. But what do we really know?

Well, in a way the sheer scale of the crisis — the way it affected much, though not all, of the world — is helpful, for research if nothing else. We can look at countries that avoided the worst, like Canada, and ask what they did right — such as limiting leverage, protecting consumers and, above all, avoiding getting caught up in an ideology that denies any need for regulation. We can also look at countries whose financial institutions and policies seemed very different from those in the United States, yet which cracked up just as badly, and try to discern common causes.

So let’s talk about Ireland.

As a new research paper by the Irish economists Gregory Connor, Thomas Flavin and Brian O’Kelly points out, “Almost all the apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case,” and vice versa. Yet the shape of Ireland’s crisis was very similar: a huge real estate bubble — prices rose more in Dublin than in Los Angeles or Miami — followed by a severe banking bust that was contained only via an expensive bailout.

Ireland had none of the American right’s favorite villains: there was no Community Reinvestment Act, no Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. More surprising, perhaps, was the unimportance of exotic finance: Ireland’s bust wasn’t a tale of collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps; it was an old-fashioned, plain-vanilla case of excess, in which banks made big loans to questionable borrowers, and taxpayers ended up holding the bag.

So what did we have in common? The authors of the new study suggest four “ ‘deep’ causal factors.”

First, there was irrational exuberance: in both countries buyers and lenders convinced themselves that real estate prices, although sky-high by historical standards, would continue to rise.


Second, there was a huge inflow of cheap money. In America’s case, much of the cheap money came from China; in Ireland’s case, it came mainly from the rest of the euro zone, where Germany became a gigantic capital exporter.

Third, key players had an incentive to take big risks, because it was heads they win, tails someone else loses. In Ireland this moral hazard was largely personal: “Rogue-bank heads retired with their large fortunes intact.” There was a lot of this in the United States, too: as Harvard’s Lucian Bebchuk and others have pointed out, top executives at failed U.S. financial companies received billions in “performance related” pay before their firms went belly-up.

But the most striking similarity between Ireland and America was “regulatory imprudence”: the people charged with keeping banks safe didn’t do their jobs. In Ireland, regulators looked the other way in part because the country was trying to attract foreign business, in part because of cronyism: bankers and property developers had close ties to the ruling party.


There was a lot of that here too, but the bigger issue was ideology. Actually, the authors of the Irish paper get this wrong, stressing the way U.S. politicians celebrated the ideal of homeownership; yes, they made speeches along those lines, but this didn’t have much effect on lenders’ incentives.

What really mattered was free-market fundamentalism. This is what led Ronald Reagan to declare that deregulation would solve the problems of thrift institutions — the actual result was huge losses, followed by a gigantic taxpayer bailout — and Alan Greenspan to insist that the proliferation of derivatives had actually strengthened the financial system. It was largely thanks to this ideology that regulators ignored the mounting risks.


So what can we learn from the way Ireland had a U.S.-type financial crisis with very different institutions? Mainly, that we have to focus as much on the regulators as on the regulations. By all means, let’s limit both leverage and the use of securitization — which were part of what Canada did right. But such measures won’t matter unless they’re enforced by people who see it as their duty to say no to powerful bankers.

That’s why we need an independent agency protecting financial consumers — again, something Canada did right — rather than leaving the job to agencies that have other priorities. And beyond that, we need a sea change in attitudes, a recognition that letting bankers do what they want is a recipe for disaster. If that doesn’t happen, we will have failed to learn from recent history — and we’ll be doomed to repeat it.


http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/opinion/08krugman.html

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The stories were taken from the websites of Taiwan's United Daily News and The New York Times, the copyright remain with their original owners.  The authors of the stories, United Daily News and The New York Times are not involved with, nor endorse the production of this blog.