*** This is my latest project about Deleuze and Guattari.
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The ideological approach is in many ways closer to Deleuze and Guattari's approach than either the communicational or postmodern, in spite of their frequent criticisms of it. It has major advantages over them. For one thing, it links the workings of language to a problematic of power, insisting on the intrinsic connection between language and extra-linguistic forces. It also breaks the symmetry between expression and things ' as they are ' already. Models of mirroring or moulding - in a word, representational models - see the basic task of expression as faithfully reflecting a state of things. They focus on the ' as it ', as it is taken up by language. Ideolage critique focuses on the ' what might be ' . Its preoccupation is change. To open the way for change, it must break the symmetry between the saying and the said. It does this by trasforming the content-expression correspondence into an asymmetry, as subject--object polarity. The question is displaced onto what govers their dialectic: how the two come together, or what mediates their interaction. Mediation steals centre stage from conformity and correspondence.
The problem for Deleuze and Guattari is that conformity and correspondence sneak back in through the back door. The subject formed through the dialectic does not simply mirror its objects. It embodies the system of mediation. It is a physical instantiation of that system. That is the ideological proposition: that a subject is made to be in conformity with the system that produced it, such that the subject reproduces the system. What reproduces the system is not what the subject says. The direct content of its expressions do not faithfully reflect the system, since the relation of the system to its own expressed content has been ' mystified ' by mediation. The fundamental mystification consists in making the subject's adhesion to the system appear as a choice. Mystified, the subject must be trained to truly express the system it has unwittingly been reproducing. This is the role of critique.
The subject does not express the system. It is an expression of the system. The system express itself in its subjects' every ' chosen ' deed and mystified word -- in its very form of life. Where, in the conformity and correspondence between the lifeform of the subject and the system of power that produced it, has the potential for change gone? Conscious critique seems an unloaded weapon in the face of the relentless acting out of powers of conformity on the preconscious level of habitus. The only conscious force strong enough to counter those powers is self-interest: a subject must come to an unmystified consciousness of its own interests as occupying the position it does. But doesn't that lock the subject all the more firmly into position? And aren't decisions truly motivated by self-interest a matter of choice? Doesn't making a true choice depend on seeing through mystification to an analysis of the real state of affairs ( designation ), then faithfully conveying the general applicability of the ideological propositions arrived at ( signification ) to others of your class, as one sovereign individual in voluntary congregation, usefully sharing thoughts and experiences ( manifestation )? Aren't we back at the same old communicational model? Designation, manifestation, signification resurgent. Perhaps insurgent. But is this change enough?
The move to save change by breaking the symmetries at the basis of the propositional view of language has back-fired. They return, in conformity and correspondence, as if in conformation of the doctrine that production is always actually, systematically, reproduction. If production is reproduction, then life is trapped in a vicious circle: that of the systemic repetition of its own formation ( wholesale or in self-interested part ). Still the initial emphasis has shifted from form, as mirrored or moulded, to formation. And it has done so in a framework that broadens the vistas of expression. It is no longer a question of language narrowly defined. It is also a question of extra-linguistic forces operating through language, as well as unspoken systems of signs ( what the configuration of objects in the social field, and their patterns of accessibility, indirectly ' tells ' the subject-in-making of its assigned position ). As we will see in the course of this introduction, Deleuze and Guattari agree that the subject is in a sense spoken by extra-linguistic forces of expression, and that this impersonal speaking is not a matter of choice. But they do not see anything ' hidden ' to uncover, nor are they willing to reduce the expressing individual to an instantiation of a system. From their perspective, the force of expression and the linguistically formed exercises of power it often fuels are painfully evident. The force of expression, however, strikes the body first, directly and unmediatedly. It passes transformatively through the flesh before being instantiated in subject-positions subsumed by a system of power. Its immediate effect is a differing. It must be made a reproduction. The body, fresh in the throes of expression, incarnates not an already-formed system but a modification---a change. Expression is an event. The ideological question of how to think open a space for change in a grid-locked positional system is turned on its head. The task for a theory of expression is how to account for stability of form, given event. The key is to remember that ' emergence, mutation, change affect composing forces, not composed forms '. ( Deleuze,1988:87 )
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