America is leading a dangerous global slide towards subsidies, export controls and protectionism
美國正在引領全球走向補貼、出口管制及保護主義的危險滑坡。
(圖援用自原文)
Since 1945 the world economy has run according to a system of rules and norms underwritten by America. This brought about unprecedented economic integration that boosted growth, lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and helped the West prevail over Soviet Russia in the cold war.
打從1945年以來，世界經濟一直按照一種，由美國簽署的規則及規範體系運行。這帶來了，促進經濟成長，使數億人擺脫貧困，及在冷戰中協助西方，戰勝蘇聯之前所未有的經濟整合。
Today the system is in peril. Countries are racing to subsidize green industry, lure manufacturing away from friend and foe alike and restrict the flow of goods and capital. Mutual benefit is out and national gain is in. An era of zero-sum thinking has begun.
目前，該體系處於危險中。各國正競相補貼綠色產業，引誘製造業從朋友及敵人手中奪走，並限制商品及資本的流動。互利不在，在的是國家利益。一個零和思維的時代，已經開始。
The old system was already under strain, as America’s interest in maintaining it waned after the global financial crisis of 2007-09. But President Joe Biden’s abandonment of free-market rules for an aggressive industrial policy has dealt it a fresh blow. America has unleashed vast subsidies, amounting to $465bn, for green energy, electric cars and semiconductors.
舊體系已經處於壓力之下。因為，在2007-09年全球金融危機之後，美國維護它的興趣減弱。不過，為了一種激進的產業政策，美國總統喬·拜登放棄自由市場規則，已經給與它新的打擊。為綠色能源、電動汽車及半導體，美國已經發出了，總計4650億美元的巨額補貼。
These are laced with requirements that production should be local. Bureaucrats tasked with scrutinising inward investments to prevent undue foreign influence over the economy now themselves hold sway over sectors making up 60% of the stockmarket. And officials are banning the flow of ever more exports—notably of high-end chips and chipmaking equipment to China.
這些與生產應該是當地的需求混雜在一起。負責審查外來投資，以防止外國對經濟產生不當影響的官僚們，現在對於構成60%股市的部門，本身擁有支配權。因此，官員們正在禁止，越來越多出口產品的去向。特別是，高端的晶片及晶片製造設備流向中國。
For many in Washington, muscular industrial policy holds a seductive appeal. It could help seal America’s technological ascendancy over China, which has long pursued self-sufficiency in vital areas using state intervention.
對在華盛頓的許多人來說，強硬的產業政策具有一種誘人的吸引力。這可能有助於確保美國對，在諸多重要領域，長期以來一直運用國家干預，尋求自給自足之中國的技術優勢。
As carbon pricing is politically unfeasible, it could foster decarbonization. And it reflects a hope that government intervention might succeed where private enterprise failed, and reindustrialize America’s heartlands.
由於碳定價在政治上是行不通的，不過這能促進脫碳。因此這反映了一種，政府干預，在私營企業失敗的地方可能成功，及再工業化美國心臟地帶的可能性。
The immediate consequence, however, has been to set off a dangerous spiral into protectionism worldwide. Build a chipmaking plant in India and the government will stump up half the cost; build one in South Korea and you can avail yourself of generous tax breaks.
不過，直接後果已經持續在全球引發了，一種危險的保護主義漩渦。在印度建一個晶片製造廠，該政府將承擔一半的費用；在韓國建一個，能享受慷慨的減稅。
Should seven other market economies that have announced policies for “strategic” sectors since 2020 match America’s spending as a share of GDP, total outlays would reach $1.1trn. Last year nearly a third of the cross-border business deals that came to the attention of European officials received detailed scrutiny.
倘若，打從2020年以來，已經為“策略”部門宣布政策的其他七個市場經濟體，與美國之支出佔國內生產毛額(GDP：Gross Domestic Product)的比例相匹配，則總支出將會達到1.1兆美元。去年，引起歐洲官員注意的跨境商業交易中，有近三分之一遭詳細的審查。
Countries with the raw materials needed to make batteries are eyeing export controls. Indonesia has banned nickel exports; Argentina, Bolivia and Chile may soon collaborate, OPEC-style, on the output of their lithium mines.
擁有製造電池所需原材料的國家，正密切注意諸多出口管制。印尼已經禁止鎳出口；阿根廷、玻利維亞及智利可能很快，以石油輸出國組織(OPEC：Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)的樣式，針對其鋰礦的產量進行合作。
Economic conflict with China looks increasingly inevitable. As China became more deeply integrated into the global economy at the turn of this century, many in the West predicted that it would become more democratic.
與中國的經濟衝突，看來日益不可避免。隨著中國在本世紀之交，更深入融入全球經濟。於西方許多人預測，中國會變得更為民主。
The death of that hope—combined with the migration of a million manufacturing jobs to Chinese factories—caused America to fall out of love with globalisation. Today Mr Biden’s administration frets about the danger of depending on China for batteries the way Europe relied on Russia for gas before the invasion of Ukraine.
那種希望的破滅(加上數以百萬計製造業工作，轉移到中國工廠)導致美國不再熱愛全球化。目前，拜登政府擔心，有關依賴中國電池，如同在入侵烏克蘭之前，歐洲依賴俄羅斯天然氣之情況的危險性。
Democrats and Republicans alike worry that the loss of America’s lead in advanced chipmaking to Taiwan will undermine its ability to develop artificial intelligence—on which, they predict, armies of the future will rely to plan strategy and guide missiles.
民主黨及共和黨員們同樣擔心，美國在先進晶片製造領域的領先地位讓給台灣，會削弱他們發展，其預測未來的軍隊將依賴，來制定戰略及引導導彈之人工智能的能力。
Some simply want to stop China becoming too rich—as if impoverishing 1.4bn people were either moral or likely to ensure peace. Others, more wisely, focus on increasing America’s economic resilience and maintaining its military edge.
有些人只是想阻止中國變得過於富裕。好像使14億人陷入貧困，不是道德上的就是可能確保和平一樣。較明智的其他人著重於，增強美國的經濟復原力，及維持其軍事優勢。
A reindustrialisation of the heartland, they argue, will rekindle support for market capitalism. In the meantime, as the global hegemon, America can weather other countries’ complaints.
他們認為，心臟地帶的再工業化，將再度激起對市場資本主義的支持。在此同時，作為全球霸主，美國能經得起其他國家的抱怨。
This thinking is misguided. If zero-sum policies were seen as a success, abandoning them would only become harder. In reality, even if they do remake American industry, their overall effect is more likely to cause harm by corroding global security, holding back growth and raising the cost of the green transition.
這種想法是錯誤的。倘若零和政策被視為成功，則放棄它們只會變得更難。事實上，即使他們確實重塑美國工業，他們的整體影響也更可能，由於破壞全球安全、阻礙成長及提高綠色轉型的成本，而造成傷害。
One problem is their extra economic costs. The Economist estimates that replicating the cumulative investments of firms in the global tech-hardware, green-energy and battery industries would cost $3.1trn-4.6trn (3.2-4.8% of global gdp).
一個問題是其額外的經濟成本。《經濟學人》估計，複製公司在全球技術硬體、綠色能源及電池行業的累計投資，將花費3.1兆到4.6兆(佔全球GDP的 3.2-4.8%)。
Reindustrialisation will raise prices, hurting the poor most. Duplicating green supply chains will make it costlier for America and the world to wean themselves off carbon. History suggests that vast amounts of public money could go to waste.
再工業化將提高價格，對窮人的傷害最大。對美國及世界而言，複製綠色供應鏈，會使擺脫碳排放的成本更高。歷史顯示，大量公共資產可能浪費掉。
Another problem is the fury of friends and potential allies. America’s genius after the second world war was to realize that its interests lay in supporting openness in global commerce. As a result it pursued globalisation despite, by 1960, making up nearly 40% of global dollar GDP.
另一個問題是，朋友及潛在盟友的憤怒。在第二次世界大戰後，美國的思潮是認清，其利益在於支持全球商業的開放。因此，儘管到1960年，構成全球美元GDP近40%，它也追求全球化。
Today its share of output has fallen to 25% and America needs friends more than ever. Its ban on exports to China’s chipmakers will work only if the Dutch firm ASML and Japan’s Tokyo Electron also refuse to supply them with equipment.
當今，美國生產份額已經降到25%，因此其比以往任何時候，更需要朋友。 只有倘若荷蘭先進半導體材料光刻公司(ASML：Advanced Semiconductor Material Lithography)及日本東京電子，也拒絕向中國晶片製造商供應設備的情況下，美過對它們的出口禁令才會奏效。
Battery supply chains will likewise be more secure if the democratic world operates as one bloc. Yet America’s protectionism is irking allies in Europe and Asia. America must also woo emerging powers. By 2050 India and Indonesia will be the world’s third- and fourth-largest economies, projects Goldman Sachs, a bank.
倘若民主世界作為一個集團運作，電池供應鏈同樣會更為安全。然而，美國的保護主義正在惹惱，於歐洲及亞洲的盟友。美國也必須拉攏新興大國。美國高盛銀行估計，到2050年，印度及印尼將成為世界第三及第四大經濟體。
Both are democracies but not close friends of America. By 2075 Nigeria and Pakistan will have gained economic clout, too. If America demands that other countries freeze out China without offering sufficient access to its own markets then it will be spurned by rising powers.
兩者都是民主國家。不過，都不是美國的親密朋友。到2075年，奈及利亞及巴基斯坦也將會獲得經濟影響力。倘若美國要求其他國家，將中國拒之門外，不提供足夠之進入自己市場的機會，那麼它將被崛起的大國所唾棄。
A final worry is that the more economic conflict proliferates, the harder it becomes to solve problems that demand global collaboration. Despite racing to secure green technology, countries are squabbling over how to help the poor world decarbonise.
最後一個擔憂是，經濟衝突擴散得越多，解決需要全球合作的問題變得越艱難。儘管各國競相爭取綠色技術，不過各國仍在爭論，如何協助貧窮世界脫碳。
It is proving hard to rescue countries in debt distress, such as Sri Lanka, because of obstruction by China, a big creditor. If countries cannot co-operate to tackle some problems, these will become impossible to fix and the world will suffer accordingly.
由於中國這個大債權國的阻礙，正顯示難以援助諸如斯里蘭卡等，陷入債務困境的國家。倘若各國不能合作解決一些問題，這些問題將成為不可能解決，因此世界會依此遭受損失。
Nobody expects America to go back to the 1990s. It is right to seek to preserve its military pre-eminence and to avoid a dangerous dependence on China for crucial economic inputs. Yet this makes other forms of global integration all the more essential.
無人期待美國回到1990 代。尋求維持其軍事優勢，及避免在關鍵經濟的投入上，對中國的危險依賴是正確的。然而，這使得其他形式的全球一體，化變得更加重要。
It should seek the deepest co-operation between countries that is possible, given their respective values. Today this probably requires a number of overlapping forums and ad hoc deals. America should, for instance, join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an Asian trade pact based on an earlier deal it helped write but then abandoned.
鑑於各自的價值，這應該尋求，在可能的各國之間尋求最深入的合作。今天，這可能需要一些重疊的市場，及適應當前需要的交易。譬如，美國應該加入《跨太平洋夥伴關係的全面進步協定》，這是一項根據其協助起草，不過後來被放棄之早期協議的亞洲貿易協定。
Saving globalisation may seem impossible, given the protectionist turn in American politics. But Congress’s aid to Ukraine shows that voters are not insular. Surveys suggest the popularity of free trade is recovering. There are signs that the Biden administration is responding to allies’ concerns about its subsidies.
鑑於美國政治中，保護主義的轉向，拯救全球化似乎是不可能的。不過，美國國會對烏克蘭的援助，顯示選民並非是孤立的。諸多調查顯示，自由貿易的受歡迎程度正恢復中。有諸多拜登政府正對，盟友對其補貼之憂慮，作出反應的跡象。
Yet rescuing the global order will require bolder American leadership that once again rejects the false promise of zero-sum thinking. There is still time for that to happen before the system collapses completely, damaging countless livelihoods and imperilling the causes of liberal democracy and market capitalism.
然而，拯救全球秩序將需要，更大膽的美國領導，再次拒絕零和思維的錯誤承諾。在此體系徹底崩潰、損害無數生計和危及自由民主與市場資本主義的理想之前，還需時間發生那情況。
The task is enormous and urgent; it could hardly be more important. The clock is ticking.
任務艱巨且緊迫;它再重要不過了。時間正不斷流逝中。
網址：https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/01/12/the-destructive-new-logic-that-threatens-globalisation
翻譯：許東榮
文章定位：
