Mar 26th 2022
In mid-february Russia seemed on the verge of a revolution with a distinctly reddish tint. Alisher Usmanov, an oligarch, was developing Udokan, a copper mine in Siberia that required removing an entire mountain top.
在2022年2月中旬，俄羅斯似乎處於一場，具有明顯微紅色調的革命邊緣。寡頭統治集團成員，Alisher Usmanov正在開發，一處位於西伯利亞的烏多坎礦場(Udokan，需要移除整個山頂的銅礦場)。
In the Arctic tundra Kaz Minerals, a mining firm, had raised enough cash to build Baimskaya, a rival mine so remote that it needed its own port, icebreaker and floating nuclear plant.
在北極苔原，一家採礦公司，Kaz Minerals已經募集足夠的資金，來建造 Baimskaya。這是一個很偏遠的競爭礦場，以至於其需要自己的港口、破冰船及浮動核電站。
For years the projects had been put on hold because of their immense costs. But expectations of soaring demand for copper, used in everything from grids to turbines, had boosted prices of the auburn metal, making the mines viable.
多年來，由於它們龐大的成本，這些計劃一直被擱置。不過，對被使用於，從電網到渦輪機等，所有東西之銅需求飆升的預期，已經提升了該種赤褐色金屬的價格，使上述礦場變得可行。
Now the copper price is even higher. But the projects are in trouble. Insiders say they are short of vital foreign equipment that has been blocked by the West after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and that they are starved of the funds they had expected from blacklisted Russian banks.
目前，銅價甚至更高。不過，這些計劃處於困境中。內部人士表示，他們缺乏，在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後，遭西方各國封鎖的重要外國設備，而且渴望，他們一直預期來自被列入黑名單之俄羅斯銀行的資金。
Mr Usmanov, too, faces sanctions. A spokesman for Udokan says, “We are doing everything we can to ensure business continuity.” Yet even if the mine starts producing this year as planned, it is unclear who will buy its output. Foreigners, even the Chinese, are shunning Russian production.
Usmanov先生也面臨制裁。Udokan的一名發言人宣稱：「我們正竭盡一切，來確保業務連續性。」然而，即使該礦場今年如計劃般開始生產，也不清楚誰會購買其產品。外國人，甚至中國人，都在迴避俄羅斯的產物。
As the world weans itself off dirty fuels, it must switch to cleaner energy sources. The International Energy Agency (IEA), an official forecaster, predicts that wind and solar could account for 70% of power generation by 2050, up from 9% in 2020, if the world embarks on a course to become carbon-neutral by 2050.
當世界本身擺脫骯髒的燃料時，它必須轉向較潔淨的能源。國際能源署(IEA，一個總部位於巴黎之自治政府間組織的官方預測機構)預測，倘若世界開始，到2050年實現碳中和的進程。則到2050年風能及太陽能，可能從2020年的9%，上升達佔發電量的70%。
That translates into huge demand for the metals, such as cobalt, copper and nickel, that are vital for the technologies underpinning everything from electric cars to renewables; the IEA reckons that the market size of such green metals would increase almost seven-fold by 2030. And much like fossil-fuel reserves, these commodities are distributed unevenly (see chart 1). Some countries have none at all. Others are blessed with vast deposits.
那轉變成，對支持從電動汽車到可再生能源等一切技術，不可或缺之諸如鈷、銅及鎳等，金屬的巨大需求; 國際能源署估計，到2030年，此類綠色金屬市場規模，將會增加近七倍。不過，很像化石燃料的儲量，此些商品分佈不均(見圖1)。有些國家根本沒有。其他國家很幸運，擁有大量儲藏。
The metals rush will not be as big as the oil-and-gas boom that toppled King Coal after the second world war. But there are some echoes with the past. Between 1940 and 1970 the share of hydrocarbons in the energy supply of rich countries rose from 26% to nearly 70%.
此些金屬熱潮不會如二戰後，顛覆煤王之石油及天然氣的榮景般大。不過，與過去有些呼應。在1940年至1970年間，在富裕國家的能源供應中，碳氫化合物的份額，從26%上升到近70%。
Once-marginal economies in the Middle East were transformed into uber-rich petrostates. Between 1970 and 1980 the GDP per person of Qatar and Saudi Arabia grew 12- and 18-fold, respectively. Bedouin villages became boom towns; fishing dhows gave way to super tankers and luxury yachts.
在中東曾經處於邊緣地位的經濟體，轉變成超級富裕的石油國家。在1970年至1980年間，卡達及沙烏地阿拉伯每人的國內生產毛額(GDP：Gross Domestic Product)，分別成長了12倍及18倍。阿拉伯部族的諸多貝都因村莊，變成了繁榮的城鎮；釣魚的單桅三角帆船，被超級油輪及豪華遊艇取代。
This time the transition will bring windfalls to countries we dub the “green-commodity superpowers”. We calculate that this club, many of which are poor economies and autocracies, could pocket more than $1.2trn in annual revenue from energy-related metals by 2040.
這次轉變會為，我們稱為“綠色商品超級大國”的國家，帶來意外之財。我們估計，到2040年，此俱樂部(其中諸多是貧窮的經濟體及獨裁國家)可能從與能源相關的金屬，將超過1.2兆美元納入每年的歲收中。
With the opportunity, however, come risks. As the troubled mining projects in Russia show, important investments can become victims of local conditions and geopolitics.
不過，機會隨之而來的是風險。正如於俄羅斯陷入困境的採礦計劃所顯現的那樣，重要的投資可能成為，當地條件及地緣政治的受害者。
Huge rents could corrode domestic markets and political institutions; autocrats enriched by electrodollars could make mischief beyond their borders. Saad Rahim of Trafigura, a trading firm, says the shift to clean fuels is “less an energy transition than a commodity transition”. It will be a turbulent one.
巨額租金可能會腐蝕國內諸多市場及政治機構；因電子美元致富的獨裁者，可能在其國界外製造困擾。Trafigura(一家總部位於新加坡的跨國商品貿易公司)的Saad Rahim表示，朝潔淨燃料的轉變是“一種能源較少於商品的轉變”。這會是一種動盪的轉變。
The green boom is not just another “supercycle”, as prolonged periods of high commodity prices are known. The last such cycle, early this century, was fuelled by rapid urbanisation and industrialisation in China.
綠色榮景不僅僅是另一個“超級週期”，因為眾所周知，商品價格持續居高不下。本世紀初的上一個此類周期，是因中國快速城市化及工業化激起的。
The combined real GDP of Brazil and Russia, two resource-rich economies, grew by two-thirds between 2000 and 2014. But the rally was largely driven by China alone. When the country’s leaders decided it should build fewer factories and flats, the commodity giants suffered. The green transition, by contrast, stems from the decisions of many governments, not one. And decarbonising the world is likely to be the job of decades.
在2000年至2014年間，巴西與俄羅斯這兩個資源豐富之經濟體的實際 GDP，成長達三分之二。不過，此好轉主要是由中國單獨所驅動。當該國領導人決定應該較少建造工廠及公寓時，商品巨頭們蒙受了損失。相較之下，綠色轉變源自諸多政府的決定，並非一個政府。因此，使世界脫碳很可能需要幾十年。
Another big difference lies in the materials in demand. China’s splurge burned through heaps of coal, iron and steel. The green boom centres on non-ferrous metals that are more niche. Their combined annual revenues today, at $600bn, is equivalent to only a fifth of that of the bulk materials that China favoured. There may be more explosive growth to come.
另一個大差異在於所需要的材料。中國的揮霍，消耗了大量的煤、鐵及鋼鐵。綠色榮景集中於，是更有利基的非鐵金屬上。目前，它們總和6千億美元的年度歲入，僅相當於中國青睞之大宗材料收入的五分之一。未來，或許有更爆發性的成長。
To understand which commodity producers stand to win and lose from a green transition, we construct a simple scenario for the use of ten “energy-linked” commodities in 2040, assuming that global warming by 2100 stays below 2°C.
為了瞭解哪些商品生產商，在綠色轉變中，依舊贏及輸。我們編造了一種，假設到2100年全球暖化保持在2°C以下，到2040年使用十種“與能源相關”商品的簡單腳本。
Based on data from a range of industry sources, we project demand and revenue for three fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal) and seven metals (aluminium, cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, silver and zinc) that are critical to building an electricity economy.
根據來自一系列行業的來源數據，我們估計了，有關建立電力經濟至關重要之三種化石燃料(石油、天然氣、煤炭)及七種金屬(鋁、鈷、銅、鋰、鎳、銀與鋅)的需求與歲入。
We assume that prices remain at today’s elevated levels, prompting miners to exploit untapped deposits. And we assume that a producer’s market share in 2040 is in line with its share of known reserves.
我們假設，價格保持在目前升高的水平，促使諸多採礦公司開採未開發的礦床。結果我們認為，生產者在2040年的市場份額，與其已知儲量的份額一致。
Our findings suggest the world will be less reliant on energy-related resources in 2040 than it is today—largely because wind and sunshine, the sources of the future, are free. Total spending on our basket of ten commodities falls to 3.4% of global gdp, from 5.8% in 2021.
我們的研究結果暗示，到2040年，世界對與能源相關資源的依賴，會低於目前。主要是因為，未來的來源，風及陽光是免費的。在2021年，我們藍子中十種商品的總花費，從全球GDP的5.8%降至3.4%。
Spending on fossil fuels, relative to world GDP, falls by half (and would shrink further were it not for gas). The revenue from green metals remains smaller, but rises from 0.5% to 0.7% of GDP. It nearly triples in absolute terms.
相對於世界GDP，化石燃料的花費下降了一半(要不是天然氣，將會進一步縮小)。來自綠色金屬的歲入仍然較小，不過從GDP的0.5%上升到0.7%。在基本價格上，這近乎三倍。
The number of big producers of energy-linked commodities falls over time: 48 stand to pocket sales equivalent to more than 5% of their GDP, down from 58 in 2021 (see chart 2). More than half of total spending goes towards autocracies.
隨著時間推移，與能源相關商品的大生產商數量下降：在2021年，堅持口袋銷售(場外掛牌，或透過私人渠道而非多重掛牌服務，向潛在買家的一種銷售方式)相當於其GDP 5%以上的58家降至48家。超過半數總花費用在獨裁國家。
You can group producers into three buckets, based on the expected change in their revenues from the ten energy-linked commodities between now and 2040. The first comprises the winners—the green superpowers.
根據現在到2040年間，來自十種與能源相關商品之歲入預期的變化，可以將生產商分類到三個藍子中。第一類由贏家們組成，也就是諸多綠色超級大國。
These electro states include some rich democracies. Australia has troves of every metal included in our sample. Chile is home to 42% of the world’s lithium reserves and a quarter of its copper deposits, much of them in the Atacama desert.
此些電鍍物品國家，包括一些富裕的民主國家。澳大利亞擁有，在我們樣品中，包括的每種金屬寶物。智利擁有全球42%的鋰儲量及四分之一的銅礦藏，它們大部分是在阿塔卡馬沙漠。
Others are autocracies. Congo has 46% of global cobalt reserves (and produces 70% of the world’s output today). China is home to aluminium, copper and lithium. Poorer democracies in Asia and Latin America may also hit the jackpot. Indonesia sits on mountains of nickel. Peru holds nearly a quarter of the world’s silver.
其他是獨裁國家。剛果擁有全球46%的鈷儲藏量(且生產當今世界產量的 70%)。中國是鋁、銅及鋰的故鄉。亞洲及拉丁美洲較貧窮的民主國家也可能中大獎。印度尼西亞坐落在鎳山上。秘魯擁有世界近四分之一的白銀。
The second bucket comprises countries with revenues that stay flat, or fall a little. It includes the low-cost members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)— including Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia—and Russia.
第二類由歲入持平或略為下降的國家組成。其包括伊朗、伊拉克與沙烏地阿拉伯等，低成本之成員國的石油輸出國組織(OPEC)及俄羅斯。
Although oil revenue shrinks, their share of it expands from 45% today to 57% in 2040. Other countries, such as America, Brazil and Canada, lose fossil-fuel earnings but are able to tap vast mineral deposits.
雖然石油歲入減少，不過它們的份額，從目前的45%擴大到2040年的57%。其他諸如美國、巴西及加拿大，雖然喪失了化石燃料的收入，不過能開採巨量的礦藏。
Higher-cost petrostates lose the most. Many oil-rich nations in north Africa (Algeria, Egypt), sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Nigeria) and Europe (Britain, Norway) see their revenues shrivel. Small states like South Sudan, Timor Leste and Trinidad have theirs hit hard. The pain does not spare some Gulf states: the proceeds captured by Bahrain and Qatar, for instance, decline by a fifth or more.
成本較高的石油國家損失最大。在北非(阿爾及利亞、埃及)、撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲(安哥拉、尼日利亞)及歐洲(英國、挪威)等，諸多石油資源豐富的國家意識到，其歲入的萎縮。像南蘇丹、東帝汶及千里達等，小國受到了重創。這種苦惱，一些海灣國家(與波斯灣接壤或靠近波斯灣的產油國)也不例外：譬如，巴林及卡達獲得的收益，減少了五分之一或更多。
What might prevent the new commodity superpowers emerging? The key ingredient is capital spending. The IEA estimates that major mines that came online in the past decade took, on average, 16 years to build. To meet booming demand by 2040, the industry must splash out on new projects now.
什麼能阻止新商品超級大國的出現？關鍵要素是資本支出。國際能源署估計，過去十年上線的主要礦坑，平均需要16年才能建成。為了迎合到2040年之蓬勃發展的需求，目前該產業必須大手筆開發新方案。
The sums required are big. Julian Kettle of Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy, reckons $2trn must be spent on green-metal exploration and production (e&p) by 2040. Recent projects suggest digging out enough copper and nickel alone would require $250bn-350bn in capital expenditure (capex) well before 2030.
所需的金額很大。Wood Mackenzie諮詢公司的Julian Kettle估計，到2040年，必須花費2兆美元於綠色金屬的勘探及生產(e&p)。最近的諸多方案暗示，在2030年之前，僅開採足夠的銅及鎳，在資本支出(capex)上，將需要2500億至3500億美元。
Some of the outlay is taking place. Anglo American, a miner, aims to expand its copper output by 50-60% by 2030. “We will deliver our part of the bargain,” says Mark Cutifani, its boss. Many others will not. Burnt by the commodity crash of the mid-2010s, mining majors have reduced investment.
其中一些支出正在發生。Anglo American採礦公司打算，到2030年，將其銅產量擴大達50-60%。其老闆，Mark Cutifani宣稱：「我們將兌現部分交易。」諸多其他公司不會。受2010年代中期，商品崩盤的影響，採礦巨頭已經減少投資。
Liberum Capital, an investment bank, calculates that annual copper e&p capex has fallen by half since 2014, to $14bn. As prices rise, so do profits. But cash is being given back to investors rather than redeployed. “Supply growth has almost become a dirty word,” says Stephen Gill of Pala Investments, a venture-capital firm.
投資銀行Liberum Capital估算，打從2014年以來，年度銅勘探暨生產資本支出已經下降達一半，至140億美元。隨著價格上漲，利潤也上漲。不過，現金正在返回投資者，而不是重新部署。風險投資公司Pala Investments的Stephen Gill宣稱：「供應的成長，幾乎已經成為一個齷齪之詞。」
Only China is spending a lot. In Kolwezi, in Congo’s cobalt belt, barefoot children greet all foreigners with shouts of “ni hao”. Chinese groups have nabbed most big commercial deposits; Albert Abel, an artisanal miner, complains they have bought most small mines too.
只有中國正支出很多。在剛果科盧韋齊(Kolwezi)之鈷礦帶，赤腳的孩子們以“你好”的喊聲，迎接所有外國人。中國集團已經搶得了，大部分的大型商業礦藏；手工礦工(一種自給自足的礦工)Albert Abel抱怨，他們也購買了大多數小型礦坑。
Glencore, an adventurous Swiss trader, is the only Western firm to have a foothold. In Indonesia Chinese miners are clearing swathes of rainforest to dig out nickel. The capex drought is a result of three daunting problems: the industry’s limited firepower, diminishing investment returns and rising political risk. Start with firepower.
一家富於冒險精神的瑞士貿易商，Glencore是唯一有據點的西方公司。在印度尼西亞，諸多中國採礦公司正在清理大片雨林，以挖掘鎳礦。資本支出枯竭是三個令人畏怯問題的結果：也就是，該產業的火力有限、投資回報減少及政治風險上升。而以火力開始。
Though what miners must spend over two decades is equivalent to only four years of typical oil e&p capex, it still seems beyond the capacity of the comparatively tiny sector. Even big miners can only fund one serious project at a time.
雖然採礦公司，在二十年內必須的支出，僅相當於典型石油勘探暨生產，四年的資本支出。不過，這似乎仍然超出相對較小採礦業的能力。即使大型採礦公司，一次也只能提供一項重大計劃的資金。
This might be fixed by tapping capital providers beyond the majors’ usually cautious public-market investors. These could include vertically integrated manufacturers that rely on scarce minerals.
這可以藉由選擇，大多數公司通常是謹慎之公開市場投資者以外的資本提供者，來解決。這些可能包括，依賴稀有礦物的垂直整合製造商。
Tesla, an electric-car maker, has promised to buy the future nickel production of mines in Australia, Minnesota and New Caledonia. Private-equity firms and state-backed national champions tasked with securing supply could also chip in.
電動汽車製造商，特斯拉已承諾購買，未來在澳大利亞、美國明尼蘇達及法國海外領地，新喀裡多尼亞開採的鎳礦。竭力確保供應的私募股權公司，及國家支持的國家龍頭企業，也可能參與。
A second problem is the worsening quality of mineral deposits. Udokan says it is the last potential mine with copper content above 1% of the rock. The average grade of Chilean copper has fallen by 30% over the past 15 years, to 0.7%.
第二個問題是惡化的礦床品質。Udokan礦場表示，這是最後一個銅含量，超過岩石1%的潛在礦床。智利銅的平均質量，在過去15年中，已經下降達30%，只有0.7%。
Lower grades are pushing up extraction and processing costs (and carbon emissions). “Today we use 16 times more energy to make the same pound of copper as we did 100 years ago,” says Mr Cutifani.
較低的質量正在推高提取及加工成本(及碳排放)。Anglo American採礦公司老闆，Cutifani先生宣稱：「目前，我們使用多16倍的能源，來生產與100年前一樣磅數的銅。」
Innovation may help. Last year BHP, another miner, and Equinor, Norway’s state-backed energy firm, invested in an artificial-intelligence startup that sifts through 20m pages of state and scientific archives to identify where new deposits might lie.
創新可能有幫助。去年，另一家採礦公司BHP及，挪威國家支持的能源公司，Equinor投資了一家，細查了2千萬頁之國家及科學檔案，以確定新礦藏可能存在處的人工智能初創公司。
In time technological breakthroughs could even make exploring sea floors profitable. The world’s 67,000km of mid-ocean ridges contain a lot of copper, cobalt and other minerals. This, too, could mint electro states: Fiji (8%) and Norway (5.5%) hold the most economic rights to those ridges.
最終，技術突破甚至可能使得探勘海床有利可圖。世界上6萬7千公里的洋中脊(橫跨大西洋、印度洋及南太平洋的海底山脈)，具有大量的銅、鈷及其他礦物。這也可能鑄造出，諸多電鍍物品國家：斐濟(8%)及挪威(5.5%)，對這些山脊，擁有最多的經濟所有權。
Yet innovation also makes future returns less certain. The durably high prices that miners need to invest will also encourage big buyers to seek alternatives to the dearest metals. Tesla’s batteries include less than 5% cobalt, down from one-third just a few years ago. Innovation could also facilitate recycling. By 2040, the IEA reckons, extracting cobalt from old batteries could help meet 12% of total demand.不過，創新也使未來的回報，變得較不確定。採礦公司需要投資的持續高價格，也會促使大買家尋找最貴之金屬的替代品。特斯拉公司的電池含有，從僅幾年前的三分之一，降到不及5%的鈷。創新也可能促進回收利用。國際能源署估計，到2040，從舊電池中提取鈷可能有助於，迎合12%的總需求。
Perhaps the biggest risk to investment comes from politics. The minerals mania stands to make some poor economies rich overnight. The story of commodity booms over centuries, including the hydrocarbon bonanza, shows that this resource blessing can also be a curse, which could in turn discourage further investment.
或許，投資的最大風險來自政治。此些礦物熱潮，依舊使一些貧窮的經濟體，在一夜之間變得富有。幾個世紀以來，商品榮景的故事包括，顯示資源恩賜也可能是，反過來可能阻礙進一步投資之詛咒的碳氫化合物豐富礦藏。
Gigantic oil rents have made many countries unstable. Rival factions vie to control riches, fuelling inequality and strife. Vast dollar inflows buoy local currencies, crushing exporters. Debt binges during boom times trigger fiscal crises when the cycle turns. Resentful populations make domestic politics even more fractious.
龐大的石油租金已經使諸多國家變得不穩定。敵對派系爭相控制，激起不平等及衝突的財富。大量美元流入，提振壓垮諸多出口商的當地貨幣。在榮景時期的債務狂潮，當周期轉變時，引發諸多財政危機。憤慨的民眾，使得國內政治甚至更為動盪(駕馭難)。
Take Nigeria. In 1965 it exported ten different commodities, from cocoa to tin. Two decades of oil discoveries later, petroleum accounted for 97% of its merchandise exports, and had contributed to political instability.
以奈及利亞為例。於1965年，出口了十種不同的商品，從可可到錫。石油發現後的20年後，石油占其商品出口的97%，卻已經導致政治不穩定。
The worry now is that history repeats itself. Some electro states are poorly equipped to manage windfalls. The majority of the world’s 96 commodity-linked sovereign-wealth funds are backed by sales of fossil fuels; only seven green-metals exporters have established rainy-day funds, according to Global SWF, a data provider.
目前，擔憂是那歷史會重演。一些電鍍物品國家沒有能力處理意外獲得之物。全球96個與商品有關聯的主權財富基金，大多數以化石燃料的銷售為後盾；根據數據提供商，全球主權財富基金(Global SWF)的說法，只有七家綠色金屬出口商，已經設立應急基金。
That is despite a big need for them: much of the spending on metals is expected to take place by 2050, after which demand will ebb and exporters could face leaner times.
對它們而言，儘管那是一大需求：於金屬上的大部分支出，預計到2050年發生，此後需求將下降。因此，出口商們可能面臨，更少獲利時期。
Even the prospect of a bonanza could tempt governments to extract more rents from firms. Some tensions are already emerging. Rio Tinto, the world’s second-largest miner, was able to restart a long-stranded Mongolian project only after agreeing to write off $2.4bn in loans to the government.
甚至豐富礦藏的前景，會吸引政府從諸多公司榨取更多的租金。因此，已經出現一些緊張情勢。世界第二大採礦公司，Rio Tinto只有在同意註銷對政府的24億美元貸款後，才能重新啟動一個，長期擱置之於蒙古人民共和國的計劃。
In January Serbia withdrew the firm’s exploration permits after protests over plans for a big lithium mine. Peru’s new leftist president is mulling higher taxes; one of its biggest copper mines has been blockaded for weeks by locals demanding a share of profits. Chile is debating nationalising copper and lithium as it works on a new constitution.
在諸多抗議大型鋰礦計劃後，於(2022年)1月，塞爾維亞撤回了，該公司的諸多勘探許可證。秘魯新任左翼總統正在考慮，提高稅金；其最大的銅礦之一，已經遭要求分享利潤的當地人，封鎖達數星期。正致力於一部新憲法的智利，正在討論將銅及鋰國有化。
This volatile environment suggests metals may have to become pricier still before foreign firms think it worth taking a gamble. Price rises so far have already sent some Western miners to frontiers once deemed too perilous to explore.
此變化無常的環境暗示，在外國公司認為值得一博之前，仍然金屬可能不得不變得更昂貴。迄今為止，價格上漲已經將一些西方採礦公司送到，曾經被認為太危險，無法探戡的未開拓地方。
On March 20th Barrick Gold, a Canadian firm, signed a deal to invest $10bn in a copper mine on Pakistan’s border with Iran and Afghanistan. BHP is returning to Africa with an investment in Tanzania.
於(2022年)3月20日，一家加拿大公司，Barrick Gold簽署了一項，在巴基斯坦與伊朗及阿富汗接壤的一座銅礦，投資100億美元的交易。由於在坦桑尼亞的一項投資，BHP採礦公司正在重返非洲。
But prices may still not be high enough. Last year Ivan Glasenberg, then Glencore’s boss, said copper may have to hit $15,000 a tonne, up from today’s record $10,000, to truly incentivise new supply.
不過，價格可能還不夠高。去年，當時是Glencore老闆的Ivan Glasenberg表示，銅價可能必須從目前創紀錄的1萬美元，上升到一噸1萬5千美元，才能完全刺激新的供應。
The higher prices go, however, the more they run the risk of depressing demand, or making local politics yet more volatile. Either could cause investment to stall again.
Many would-be green giants know they can help avoid climate catastrophe.
不過，價格愈高，冒著使需求減弱，或使當地政治更加動蕩的風險愈多。 兩者都可能導致投資再次停滯。諸多自稱的綠巨人知道，他們能協助避免氣候災難。
“If we stop mining, we won’t be able to cut emissions,” says Juan Carlos Jobet, a former energy minister of Chile. To realise their super powers, though, they will need to break the curse.
智利前能源部長，Juan Carlos Jobet宣稱：「倘若停止採礦，他們將無法減少排放。」不過，為了使之成為超級大國，它們將需要打破此詛咒。
網址：https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/03/26/the-transition-to-clean-energy-will-mint-new-commodity-superpowers?utm_content=ed-picks-article-link-2&etear=nl_weekly_2&utm_campaign=a.the-economist-this-week&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=3/24/2022&utm_id=1099764
翻譯：許東榮
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