專利保護範圍是由claim來定義,不是實施例
這好像是專利的基本概念
但如果有人不信怎麼辦？
只好搬出判例了
（要是台灣的法官不這麼認為要怎麼辦呢？）
（台灣的專利侵權鑑定要點不是法律啊）
United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit
DEMARINI SPORTS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WORTH, INC.,
Defendant-Cross Appellant.
DECIDED: February 13, 2001
A determination of infringement requires a two-step analysis. "First, the claim must be properly construed todetermine its scope and meaning. Second, theclaim as properly construed must be compared to the accused device or process."Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576, 27 USPQ2d1836, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1993). "In order for a court to find infringement,the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its substantialequivalent in the accused device." Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.,38 F.3d 1192, 1199, 32 USPQ2d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
什麼時候可以用說明書的文字來限縮範圍呢？
有四個情況
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
CCS FITNESS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRUNSWICK CORPORATION and its Division LIFEFITNESS, Defendants-Appellees.
DECIDED: May 3, 2002
Generally speaking, we indulge a “heavy presumption” that a claimterm carries its ordinary and customary meaning. Johnson Worldwide,175 F.3d at 989, 50 USPQ2d at 1610; accord Gart, 254 F.3d at1341, 59 USPQ2d at 1295; Kegel, 127 F.3d at 1427, 44 USPQ2d at1127. “[I]f an apparatus claim recites a general structure withoutlimiting that structure to a specific subset of structures, we will generallyconstrue the term to cover all known types of that structure” that the patentdisclosure supports.
An accused infringer mayovercome this “heavy presumption” and narrow a claimterm’s ordinary meaning, but he cannot do so simply by pointing to thepreferred embodiment or other structures or steps disclosed in thespecification or prosecution history. Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3dat 989-90, 992, 50 USPQ2d at 1610; Burke, 183 F.3d at 1340, 51 USPQ2d at1299. Indeed, contrary to the district court’s analysis here, our case lawmakes clear that a patentee need not “describe in the specification everyconceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.” Rexnord,274 F.3d at 1344, 60 USPQ2d at 1856 (citations omitted).
Rather, as shown by our precedents, a court may constrict the ordinary meaning of a claim term inat least one of four ways. First,the claim term will not receive its ordinary meaning if the patentee acted ashis own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claimterm in either the specification or prosecution history. E.g., JohnsonWorldwide, 175 F.3d at 990, 50 USPQ2d at 1610; Rexnord, 274 F.3d at1342, 60 USPQ2d at 1854. Second, a claimterm will not carry its ordinary meaning if the intrinsic evidence shows thatthe patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of aparticular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described aparticular embodiment as important to the invention. E.g., SpectrumInt’l, 164 F.3d at 1378, 49 USPQ2d at 1068-69 (narrowing a claim term’sordinary meaning based on statements in intrinsic evidence that distinguishedclaimed invention from prior art); Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Adv.Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343-44, 58 USPQ2d 1059, 1064(Fed. Cir. 2001) (limiting claim term based in part on statements in thespecification indicating that “all embodiments” of the claimed invention used aparticular structure); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d1295, 1301, 53 USPQ2d 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (limiting claim term based inpart on statements in the specification describing a particular structure as“important to the invention”).
Third, and most relevant to this case, aclaim term also will not have its ordinary meaning if the term “chosen by thepatentee so deprive[s] the claim of clarity” as to require resort to the otherintrinsic evidence for a definite meaning. E.g., JohnsonWorldwide, 175 F.3d at 990, 50 USPQ2d at 1610; Gart, 254 F.3d at1341, 59 USPQ2d at 1295. Last, as a matterof statutory authority, a claim term will cover nothing more than thecorresponding structure or step disclosed in the specification, as well as equivalentsthereto, if the patentee phrased the claim in step- or means-plus-functionformat. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6; Watts v. XL Sys., Inc.,232 F.3d 877, 880-81, 56 USPQ2d 1836, 1838 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (construing § 112 ¶6).
Applying these principles, we hold thatthe claim term “reciprocating member,” as used in the asserted patents,encompasses the multi-component, curved structure used by the accused exercisemachines. The parties agreed before the district court that“reciprocating” simply means to move back and forth, and we accept thatdefinition on appeal. More important, “member,” as defined bycommon and technical dictionaries, refers to a “structural unit such as a. . . beam or tie, or a combination of these,” see McGraw-HillDictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms 1237 (5th ed. 1994), orto a “distinct part of a whole,” see American Heritage Dictionary 849(3d ed. 1996). Based on these definitions, we agree with CCS Fitness thatthe term “member” denotes a beam-like structure that is “a single unit in alarger whole.” It is not limited to a straight-bar structure comprising asingle component only.
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