Fighting spirit and the right Western arms may stymie a powerful foe
戰鬥精神及最適宜的西方武器，可能使強大的敵人受到挫折。
Apr 23rd 2022
TAIPEI, TOKYO AND WASHINGTON, DC
On a friday night in Taipei, dozens of people gather in a bookstore to learn what to do if war comes to Taiwan. The shop window is plastered with slogans denouncing China and supporting freedom in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
在台北，一個星期五晚上，數十人聚集在一家，櫥窗貼上了，諸多譴責中國及支持西藏、新疆與香港自由之標語的書店，來獲悉倘若台灣發生戰爭，該怎麼辦。。
Nearby is a new protest wall: a Ukrainian flag speckled with Post-it notes in English, Mandarin and Taiwanese. “Stand with Ukraine”, says one. “Fuck Putin”, exclaims another. A third declares: “China, Russia: langbeiweijian” . ie, a wolf and a bei (a mythical beast) colluding to do evil.
附近有一堵新的抗議牆：一面點綴著英語、普通話(標準中國語)及台語便利貼的烏克蘭國旗。有個人說：「與烏克蘭站在一起。」另一個人喊叫：「操普丁。」第三個人宣稱：「中國，俄羅斯：狼狽為奸。」即，狼與狽(神話中的野獸)勾結作惡。
This refers to a traditional story of two deformed creatures—a wolf with long front legs and short hind ones, and a bei with the opposite impairment—collaborating to devour sheep.
這指的是，具有長前腿、短後腿的狼與具有相反殘疾的狽，這兩種醜陋生物進行勾結，來狼吞虎嚥羊的一個傳說故事。
With China and Russia declaring their friendship has “no limits”, Taiwanese fear they will be the next prey. How to survive? In the bookshop, a former naval signaller and a Krav Maga martial-arts instructor lead discussions on disaster planning, self-defence, mutual aid, treating wounds and more.
隨著中國與俄羅斯宣布他們的友誼“無極限”，台灣人擔心他們會成為下一個獵物。在書店裡，一位前海軍信號員及一位以色列近身格鬥術(Krav Maga)的武術教練領頭，針對災難規劃、自衛、互助、治療傷口等，進行諸多討論。
Such workshops have become especially popular since the invasion of Ukraine, notes T.H. Schee, the signaller. “A year ago, most people thought we would never see war in our generation,” he explains. “Ukraine made everyone realise: war is here.” The session is a rare chance to overcome defeatism, he thinks. “We focus on protecting yourself, your family and your community first. We empower them to do something.”
該名信號員，T.H. Schee特別提及，打從俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭以來，此類討論會已經變得特別普遍。他解釋：「一年前，大多數人認為，我們這一代絕不會看到戰爭。不過，烏克蘭使得每個人意識到：戰爭就在這裡。」他認為，這種討論會是克服失敗主義的難得機會。「首先，我們著重於保護自己、家人及社區。要使他們能做點事。」
Invasion from the mainland has been a worry ever since China’s nationalist rulers lost a civil war against the communists and fled to Taiwan in 1949. For a long time the two entities both claimed to be the legitimate government of China.
打從中國國民黨統治者，在與共產黨的內戰中，失敗並於1949年逃往台灣以來，來自大陸的侵犯，一直是件令人擔憂的事。長期以來，這兩實體都聲稱是中國的合法政府。
A distinct Taiwanese identity has gradually formed, but Taiwan, which still calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), dares not declare itself independent for fear of provoking the mainland. That leaves it in limbo: a vibrant democracy and the world’s biggest purveyor of advanced semiconductors, which has diplomatic relations with just 14 countries.
鮮明的台灣身份(主體性)已經逐漸形成。不過，仍然自稱為中華民國(ROC)的台灣，不敢自行宣布獨立，生怕惹惱大陸。那使其處於不確定狀態：也就是，一個充滿活力，且是世界上最大先進半導體供應商，不過僅與14個國家有外交關係的民主國家。
Over the decades, Taiwan has swung from the delusion of reconquering the mainland to a deepening hopelessness—a sense that it can do little on its own to defeat an invasion. As a share of GDP, defence spending fell from 5.2% in 1990 to 2.7% in 2000 and 1.9% in 2020 (it may rise to 2.1% this year). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reckons that, in dollar terms, China’s defence budget is 20 times larger than Taiwan’s.
幾十年來，台灣已經從重新打敗大陸的幻想，轉向日益加深的絕望。這是一種，無法靠自己擊敗來犯的感覺。作為國內生產毛額(GDP：Gross domestic product)的一部分，國防開支從1990年的5.2%下降到2000年的2.7%，及 2020年的1.9%(今年(2022年)可能上升到2.1%)。瑞典斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所(致力於研究衝突、軍備、軍備控制及裁軍的國際獨立機構)估計，以美元計算，中國的國防預算比台灣多20倍。
Defence spending has been unpopular in Taiwan, in part because of the legacy of nearly four decades of military dictatorship, which ended in 1987. The armed forces are shrinking as they give way to an all-volunteer force. What little remains of conscription—four months for men—is regarded as a waste of time and often shirked.
在台灣，國防開支一直不受歡迎。部分原因是，於1987年結束之近四十年軍事獨裁統治的遺產(遺留下的影響)。由於被完全由志願者組成的部隊所取代，武裝部隊正在萎縮中。剩下徵兵(男性服役四個月)的少數，被認為是一種時間的浪費，且經常被設法規避。
The infantry’s strongest skills, Mr Schee quips, are “painting walls, picking grass and falsifying documents”. For a time, some Taiwanese thought trade with China might stay its hand, but the aggressive nationalism of Xi Jinping, China’s president, has dispelled that illusion. For the most part, Taiwan has sheltered behind the shield of American deterrence.
Schee先生譏諷，步兵最強的技能是“粉刷牆壁、除草及偽造文件”。有段時間，一些台灣人認為，與中國的貿易可能停止。不過，中國國家主席習近平，咄咄逼人的民族主義，已經消除了那種錯覺。極大程度上，臺灣一直躲在美國威懾力量的盾牌後面。
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is causing a profound rethinking. The stout resistance by Ukrainians gives some Taiwanese hope that they, too, might be able to hold off a powerful foe. Yet the war also brings two sobering thoughts. One is that neither the threat of sanctions nor the West’s arming of Ukraine deterred Russia. The other is that Russia’s nuclear threats have deterred America from intervening directly. China, too, has nuclear weapons.
俄羅斯的入侵烏克蘭正在引發一種，發自內心深處的反思。烏克蘭人的頑強抵抗，使一些台灣人產生了，他們可能也能抵擋住強大敵人的希望。然而，此戰爭也帶來了兩個發人省思的想法。一個是，制裁威脅及西方對烏克蘭的武裝，皆沒有威懾住俄羅斯。另一個是，俄羅斯的核威脅，已經威懾住美國直接干預。而中國也有核武器。
Contradictory emotions are apparent in a poll by the Taiwan Centre for International Strategic Studies, a think-tank. It showed a startling jump in the share of Taiwanese willing to fight to defend Taiwan, from 40% in December to 70% in March.
在一項由台灣國際戰略研究中心(一個智庫)進行的民意調查中，諸多矛盾情緒是清晰可見的。在台灣人願意為保衛台灣而戰的比例上，它顯示了，從2021年12月40%到2022年3月70%的驚人躍升。
A similar percentage supported extending the conscription period, a move currently under debate. But confidence that America would intervene has dropped markedly, from 55% to 43%. Scarcely a third of respondents thought Taiwan could hold off an invasion alone.
相似的百分比支持延長徵兵期，這是目前辯論中的一項措施。不過，對美國會介入的信心顯著下降，從55%降至43%。幾乎不到三分之一的受訪者，認為台灣能單獨抵擋住侵犯。
Many in Taiwan thus watch the war in Ukraine with a mix of hope and dread. Its full lessons will depend on the outcome. But an obvious one is the importance of time: to prepare defences and international assistance before a war; and, once one starts, to hold out long enough for help from friends to arrive.
因此，在台灣許多人，以一種混雜著希望及恐懼的心情，留神觀察於烏克蘭的這場戰爭。其全部殷鑑將取決於結果。不過，一個顯而易見的問題，是時間的重要性：在戰前準備防禦及國際援助；也就是，一旦戰爭開打，在來自友邦的協助到達之前，能持續夠長的抵抗時間。
But Ukraine is a largish country in the heart of Europe; Taiwan is a smallish island-state. Taiwan is thus blessed and cursed by what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago calls “the stopping power of water”. Taiwan is harder for a foe to invade, but also harder for its friends to resupply. Another difference is economic heft.
不過，烏克蘭是歐洲中心一個頗大的國家。台灣是一個略小的島國。因此台灣遭到，美國芝加哥大學美國政治學家及國際關係學者，John Mearsheimer稱為“水制動力”的祝福及詛咒。敵人較難侵犯台灣，不過在其友邦到來之前，也較難再補給。另一項差異是經濟的重要性。
It will be tougher for the West to impose sanctions on China of the kind it has used to punish Russia. As the world’s second-largest economy (the largest if measured at purchasing-power parity), China is far more diversified and more integrated in global trade than Russia.
西方對中國實施，其用來懲罰俄羅斯的那種制裁，會是更為艱難。作為世界第二大經濟體(倘若以購買力的比值，則最大)，中國遠比俄羅斯更為多元化，且更為融入全球貿易。
Even so, many in the West hope President Vladimir Putin’s military troubles in Ukraine will give Mr Xi pause. He will be even more conscious of the possibility of military failure—for him and for China’s Communist Party.
即便如此，諸多西方國家希望弗拉基米爾·普丁總統，在烏克蘭的軍事麻煩，會使習先生產生猶豫。對他及中國共產黨而言，他會是更為意識到，軍事失敗的可能性。
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought a war since its border conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Its leaders worry about “peacetime disease”. A Pentagon report notes that it is undergoing extensive reforms that could hamper its combat readiness until 2027 (but give it better options thereafter).
打從1979年與越南發生邊界衝突以來，中國人民解放軍(PLA)未曾打過一場戰爭。其領導人們擔心“和平時期的弊病”。美國五角大廈的一份報告指出，它正在進行可能阻礙其戰備，直到2027年的諸多廣泛改革(不過，此後會給予它更好的諸多選擇)。
China’s generals will learn from Russia’s mistakes in Ukraine, as they do from any conflict with parallels to Taiwan (the Falklands war of 1982 is a favourite).
中國的將軍們，將從俄羅斯在烏克蘭的諸多錯誤中，吸取殷鑑。因為他們從具有與臺灣類似的任何衝突中，犯下錯誤(1982年的福克蘭群島戰爭，是一場最廣受矚目的戰爭)。
“From a technical point of view, the Ukraine issue can indeed be seen as a rehearsal for a Taiwan Strait crisis,” Jin Canrong of Renmin University in Beijing told guancha.cn, a nationalist Chinese news site.“This is a very good learning opportunity. China can learn a lot from it, such as how to fight militarily, what pressure may be encountered politically, how to relieve that pressure, and so on.”
中國北京人民大學的Jin Canrong，告訴中國民族主義新聞網站guancha.cn：「從技術觀點，實際上烏克蘭問題能被視為，台海危機的一場預演。這是一個非常好的學習機會。中國能從中學到很多東西，譬如軍事上如何打仗，政治上可能遭遇什麼壓力，如何緩解此壓力，等等。」
Nothing Mr Xi learns from foreign examples is likely to alter his fundamental approach. He still favours reunification without fighting, but is prepared to use force, particularly if Taiwan makes a dash for independence. The signs are that China’s leader, who is 68, wants to achieve unification within his lifetime, ahead of his stated goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049, the centenary of the communist victory.
習先生從外國諸多例子學到的任何東西，無一可能改變其基本處理問題的方式。他仍然偏好不戰的統一，不過準備動用武力。特別是，倘若台灣朝獨立急進。種種跡象是，該現年68歲的中國領導人，希望在其有生之年，完全統一。也就是，他所宣稱，到2049年(共產主義勝利一百週年)實現“民族復興”的目標之前。
Events in Ukraine are unlikely to change his conviction that China has a window to achieve its goals while America is divided at home and struggling to restore credibility abroad after decades of failed interventions and erratic foreign policy.
於烏克蘭的事件，不太可能改變其信念。也就是，中國具有實現諸多目標的渠道，而美國在國內分裂及在數十年的干預失敗與不穩定的外交政策之後，正奮力恢復國外信譽。
And though some American alliances have been revitalised of late, Mr Xi may be heartened by the prospect of Russia preoccupying the Pentagon for years—just as wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria did for much of the past two decades.
Successive Chinese leaders have built the PLA into a formidable force, designed to conquer Taiwan while fighting off American reinforcements. Its navy now counts more ships than America’s.
雖然，最近有些美國盟邦已經被喚醒。不過，習先生或許受到了，多年來俄羅斯搶先佔領五角大廈之可能性的鼓舞。正如在阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亞及敘利亞的戰爭中，於過去二十年的大部分時間，所做的那樣。歷任的中國領導人已經將人民解放軍打造成一支，旨在用武力攻取台灣，同時擊退美國增援部隊的強大部隊。目前，其海軍共計有比美國更多艦艇。
It has developed a range of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles and sensors (known as anti-access/area-denial or a2/ad), intended to strike American and allied forces thousands of miles into the Pacific. The Pentagon says China’s conventional build-up is being matched by a nuclear one, with the aim of turning a minimal deterrent of a few hundred warheads into a stockpile of more than 1,000 warheads by 2030—closer to the size of America’s and Russia’s arsenals.
它已經開發一系列防空及反艦導彈與感測器(被通稱為反介入/區域拒止，也就是a2/ad)，旨在打擊從數千英里外，進入太平洋的美國及其盟軍。美國五角大廈表示，中國的常規建置正與核建置相匹配，其目標是到2030年，將幾百枚核彈頭的最低威懾力，轉變成1千多枚核彈頭的儲備。這接近了，美國及俄羅斯的核武庫規模。
For now, the PLA will maintain its relentless testing and harassment of Taiwan, including frequent incursions into its air-defence identification zone (ADIZ). These are part of China’s “grey-zone” tactics which stop short of combat but practise for conflict and strain the island’s defences and its politics. Given China’s cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns, many in Taiwan argue it is already under attack.
就目前而言，人民解放軍將持續其對台灣，毫不鬆懈的測試及騷擾，包括頻繁侵入其防空識別區(ADIZ)。這些是中國，在發生戰鬥前突然停止，卻為了衝突及使該島防禦與政治緊張，進行演練之“灰色地帶”戰術的一部分。鑑於中國之網路攻擊及虛假信息的宣傳活動，台灣許多人堅持已經遭到攻擊。
Should it come to war, the main lesson that China will draw from Ukraine is the need for speed—ideally achieving victory within days—to ensure that Taiwan’s government cannot organise concerted resistance and America cannot intervene effectively.
如果發生戰爭，中國將從烏克蘭吸取的主要殷鑑，是速度的需求。最好是在幾天內取得勝利，以確保臺灣政府無法組織協同的抵抗，及美國無法有效干預。
The PLA appears to have planned primarily for three types of assault: a missile barrage, an air and naval blockade, and a full-scale invasion. None guarantees a swift outcome. Bombardment will cause heavy damage but cannot easily force a surrender. A blockade would take even longer.
顯然中國人民解放軍已經計劃了，主要用於三種類型的攻擊：導彈連續猛烈轟擊，空軍與海軍封鎖，而後全面侵犯。無人能保證會有迅速到來的結果。轟炸將造成重大損失，不過無法輕易迫使投降。因為，封鎖會需要更長時間。
And the mustering of an amphibious invasion force is likely to be spotted well in advance of an attack, as Russia’s build-up was. It is anyway unclear that China has enough modern amphibious ships to move an invasion force quickly across the 180km Taiwan strait.
而且兩棲入侵部隊的集結，很可能如同俄羅斯的集結一樣，在攻擊之前就被發現。總之，不清楚中國是否有足夠的現代兩棲艦艇，將一支入侵部隊，快速移越過180公里的台灣海峽。
Some combination of these three strategies may hold more promise. Jacob Stokes of the Centre for a New American Security, a think-tank in Washington, posits one possibility: China stages a large-scale naval exercise near Taiwan, then swiftly uses the ships to blockade the island.
這三種策略的某種組合可能更具有指望。於美國首府華盛頓特區的一個智庫，新美國安全中心的Jacob Stokes，假設了一種可能性：中國在台灣附近舉行大規模海軍演習，然後迅速使用艦艇封鎖該島。
Like Mr Putin, Mr Xi threatens nuclear escalation against anyone who challenges the quarantine. As America debates how to respond, China uses the time to gather and launch its invasion force, and perhaps to decapitate the island’s government. “It’s one of the scariest scenarios,” says Mr Stokes. “It raises the cost of intervention from the outset.”
與普丁一樣，習先生威脅對任何挑戰此封鎖的國家，進行核升級。在美國爭論如何應對之際，中國利用此時間集結並發動入侵部隊，或許能瓦解該島政府。Stokes先生宣稱：「這是最可怕的腳本之一。因為，從開始就增加了干預成本。」
Taiwan has for years talked about adopting its own a2/ad tactics as part of an “asymmetric” strategy, in which the weaker side uses defensive weapons, concealment and subterfuge to frustrate its foe.
多年來，台灣一直在談論，採用自己的 a2/ad戰術作為“不對稱”戰略的一部分。在這種戰略中，較弱的一方使用防禦性武器、隱匿及詭計，來挫敗其敵人。
America has been encouraging Taiwan to develop a “porcupine” doctrine. The concept has gone by names such as “Hard roc” and the “Overall Defence Concept”. The latter was championed by a former Taiwanese military chief, Lee Hsi-Ming.
美國一直鼓勵台灣發展一種“豪豬”策略。此概念已經被稱為，諸如“硬石”及“整體防禦概念”。 後者受到了，前台灣軍事首長李喜明的支持。
It called for Taiwan to buy “a low quantity of high-quality platforms”, eg, jet fighters, ships and submarines, to fend off China’s grey-zone attacks. And it emphasised acquiring “a large number of small things”, especially anti-ship missiles, to ward off an invasion—preferably at sea, possibly on the beaches and if necessary in the mountains of Taiwan.
美國呼籲台灣購買“少量、高質量的平台”。譬如，噴射式戰鬥機、艦艇及潛艇，來抵禦中國之灰色地帶的攻擊。不過，它強調獲取“大量小東西”，特別是反艦飛彈，來抵擋入侵。最好是在海上，可能在海灘上，必要時在台灣山區。
Mr Lee points to the Javelin anti-tank missile used by Ukrainian soldiers. “If Ukraine had only tanks, could they fight Russia? Think of 1,000 Ukrainian tanks versus 10,000 Russian tanks. Then think of 10,000 Russian tanks versus 100,000 Ukrainian Javelins. That is asymmetric warfare.”
李先生指著烏克蘭士兵使用的標槍反坦克飛彈，宣稱：「倘若烏克蘭只有坦克，他們能對抗俄羅斯嗎？想想1千輛烏克蘭坦克及1萬輛俄羅斯坦克。然後，想想1萬輛俄羅斯坦克及10萬枚烏克蘭標槍飛彈。那才是不對稱戰爭。」
Taiwan still espouses an asymmetric strategy, but Mr Lee’s vision appears to have been watered down through a combination of individual services’ love of expensive kit and genuine doubts. Taiwan is buying and developing mines and anti-ship, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, but far too few, argues Mr Lee.
台灣仍然採取不對稱戰略。不過，透過結合了個人服務部門，對於昂貴裝備的熱愛及諸多真正的疑慮。顯然，李先生的看法已經被淡化。李先生認為，台灣正在購買及開發地雷及反艦艇、反坦克與防空武器。不過，太少了。
He and American critics question the billions being spent on expensive systems—be they indigenous attack submarines or American m1 Abrams tanks, Apache and Black Hawk helicopters and F-16v jets. “They are buying stuff for things that won’t give them much security,” argues Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University.
他及諸多美國批評者質疑，數十億美元被花費在昂貴系統上。也就是，本土的攻擊性潛艇，或美國M1艾布拉姆斯坦克、阿帕契與黑鷹直升機及F-16v 噴射式戰鬥機。美國喬治城大學的Evan Medeiros辯稱：「他們正在購買，不會給予他們太多安全感的裝備物。」
In a war, he suggests, many of the high-end weapons will be quickly destroyed or rendered ineffective; the American navy might tell Taiwan not to deploy its submarines lest they be mistaken for Chinese ones.
他暗示，在一場戰爭中，諸多高端武器會很快被摧毀或失效。美國海軍可能告訴台灣，不要部署其潛艇，以免被誤認為中國潛艇。
Shu Hsiao-huang of the Institute for National Defence and Security Research, a think-tank funded by the defence ministry, demurs: “We have the Taiwan Strait. So our first battle is going to be there. We need equipment to control the air and sea.” He also argues that, right now, “the threat of war is 10% but the peacetime threat of grey-zone activity is 90%.”
由國防部資助之智庫，國防暨安全研究所的舒曉煌，提出異議：「我們有台灣海峽。因此，我們的第一場戰鬥，會是在那裡。我們需要控制空中及海上的裝備。”他也認為，目前，「戰爭威脅為10%。不過，和平時期之灰色地帶的活動威脅是90%。」
And even in a war, he says, Taiwan must be ready to keep air corridors and sea lanes open because it has no guarantee that America will. Phil Davidson, the former commander of American forces in the Indo-Pacific, argues that Taiwan needs offensive weapons.
他表示，即使在戰爭中，臺灣也必須準備好，保持空中走廊及海上航道的暢通。因為，沒有保證美國能做到。前印太地區的美軍司令， Phil Davidson認為，臺灣需要攻擊性武器。
“There’s too much discussion of an amphibious assault. China has a lot of other ways to pound Taiwan into submission, including missiles and cyber-attacks. If the Chinese don’t know their forces or points of departure are at risk, you cannot deter them. You can’t win at soccer only in defence. You have to be able to score a goal.”
「有太多攸關兩棲攻擊的討論。中國有包括導彈及網路攻擊等，很多其他方法，來讓台灣屈服。倘若中國人不知道，他們的部隊或出發點處於危險之中，就無法阻止他們。不能僅在防守上贏得足球，必須能進球。」
It is of course easier to play catenaccio , the rigid Italian “strong chain” defence, if your teammates can hit the back of the net. The Baltic states have no jet fighters, but rely on NATO allies to protect their airspace against Russia. Can Taiwan count on America? There is no equivalent of NATO in Asia.
倘若隊友能射中球門後面，那麼當然較容易玩鏈式防守(嚴密的意大利式“強鏈”防守)。波羅的海國家沒有噴射式戰鬥機，不過依靠北大西洋公約組織(NATO：North Atlantic Treaty Organization，北約)盟邦，來保護他們的領空，免受俄羅斯的攻擊。台灣能指望美國嗎？在亞洲，沒有相當於北約的組織。
America promises to help Taiwan with the means to defend itself but leaves unsaid whether it would go to war with China over the island. America hints at a greater readiness to fight, and risk nuclear escalation, for Taiwan than for Ukraine. Yet this falls well short of the “sacred obligation” to defend every inch of nato, as President Joe Biden puts it.
美國允諾，以提供自行防衛、卻維持不表明是否會因台灣問題，與中國開戰的這種方式，來協助台灣。美國暗示，台灣處於比烏克蘭更充分準備作戰的狀態，及冒著核升級的風險。然而，如同Joe Biden總統所陳述，這與防衛北約每寸土地的“神聖義務”相去甚遠。
Such “strategic ambiguity” is meant to prevent both an attack by China and a declaration of independence by Taiwan. But as the balance of power shifts, the danger is that such uncertainty may fail to deter the former, and dishearten the latter.
這種“戰略模糊”是為了，防止中國發動襲擊及台灣宣布獨立。不過，隨著兵力平衡的轉變。危險在於，這種不確定性可能無法阻止前者，而使後者感到沮喪。
In contrast with the mutual-defence commitment of NATO’s 30 allies, America’s alliances in Asia are more akin to a hub with spokes. America’s alliances in Asia are more akin to a hub with spokes. America has separate agreements with Australia, Japan, South Korea and others—but they have no obligations to each other. That said, many of them have voiced their interest in preserving the status quo across the Taiwan strait.
與北約30個盟邦的共同防禦承諾相較下，美國在亞洲的盟邦，更像是具有輻條的樞紐。美國與澳大利亞、日本、韓國及其他國家，有各別的協議。不過，它們彼此之間沒有義務。儘管如此，其中多國已經表明，有興趣維持橫跨台灣海峽的現狀。
Ad hoc partnerships are forming for limited purposes. The “Quad”—a loose group of America, India, Japan and Australia—discusses everything from maritime security to economic co-operation and covid.
將就的夥伴關係正為了，有限的目的形成中。該由美國、印度、日本及澳大利亞組成之“四聯盟”的鬆散集團討論了，從海上安全到經濟合作及冠狀病毒症(Covid：Coronavirus Disease)的所有問題。
Under the AUKUS partnership, America works with Australia and Britain to develop nuclear-powered submarines for Australia; this is being extended to domains such as hypersonic missiles. Some hope these networks will mesh into a whole strong enough to contain China, but mounting a coherent joint response will be difficult.
在AUKUS(由澳洲、英國及美國，於2021年9月15日，聯合宣布成立的軍事安全合作夥伴)的夥伴關係下，美國與澳大利亞及英國合作，為澳大利亞開發核動力潛艇。這正在擴展到，諸如高超音速導彈等領域。有些人希望，此些網狀組織能融合成一個，強大足於遏制中國的整體。不過，會很難發動一致的聯合反應。
Japan’s role is important, given its powerful navy, its proximity and the American forces on Okinawa and elsewhere on its territory. On clear days, Taiwan is in sight of Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost territory. The two countries are among each others’ top trading partners, though they have no formal ties.
鑒於日本強大的海軍、鄰近地區及沖繩與其領土上其他地方的美軍，其角色很重要。在晴朗的日子裡，台灣能看到日本最西端的領土─與那國島。雖然這兩個國家沒有正式關係，不過它們是彼此最大的貿易夥伴之一。
The shipping lanes around Taiwan are essential for Japan’s trade, in particular energy and food imports. People-to-people ties are strong, too. Taiwan is far less resentful of its time as a Japanese colony than other countries once ruled by Japan are.
台灣四周的航道對日本的貿易至關重要，特別是能源及糧食進口。人與人之間的聯繫也很牢固。與曾經被日本統治的其他國家相較下，台灣對其作為日本殖民地時期的怨恨要少得多。
For all Japan’s pacifist leanings, there is a growing realisation that it is bound to be involved in any war over Taiwan. To help Taiwan, America would rely on its bases in Japan. China may attack them, either pre-emptively or in response to intervention. It could try to seize the disputed Senkaku islands near Taiwan, which Japan controls, or otherwise violate Japanese territorial waters or airspace.
儘管日本有和平主義傾向，不過有一種，它必然會捲入任何攸關台灣之戰爭，日益增強的認知。為了協助台灣，美國將仰賴其在日本的諸多基地。 中國可能先發制人，或對干預作出攻擊它們的反應。因此，可能試圖奪取日本控制之台灣附近有爭議的尖閣諸島，或以其他方式侵犯日本領海或領空。
The capture of Taiwan would usher in Chinese dominance in Asia, which Japan has historically resisted. Abe Shinzo, a former Japanese prime minister, summed it up last December: “A Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency, and therefore a contingency for the Japan- us alliance. Beijing, President Xi Jinping in particular, should not have any misunderstanding in recognising this.”
佔領台灣將宣告，日本歷來一直抗拒之中國在亞洲主導地位的到來。日本前首相安倍晉三(Abe Shinzo)，去年12月總結：「台灣的意外事件是日本的意外事件，因此也是日美同盟的意外事件。中國北京，特別是習近平主席，在認知這一點上，不應該有任何誤解。」
Grey-zone scenarios put Japan in a trickier position. Following changes to the interpretation of the constitution in 2015, Japan’s self-defence forces (SDF) can be deployed for combat even if Japan is not attacked, so long as the situation is deemed to be of “existential” importance.
灰色地帶的腳本，使日本處於更棘手的處境。在2015年，修改憲法的解釋之後，即使日本沒有遭到攻擊，只要情況被認為具有“存在的”重要性。日本自衛隊(SDF)可以進行戰鬥部署。
Yet that is a fundamentally political assessment. The public might balk; so too might Komeito, the pacifist coalition partner of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. Japanese war games often end with participants tying themselves up in legal knots.
不過，那全然是個政治評估。公眾會猶豫；占主導地位之自民黨的和平聯盟夥伴，公明黨(日本一個中間偏右的政黨)也會如此。日本的戰爭計劃，經常以參與者，將自己綁在法律結上而告終。
Precisely how Japan might help is unclear, not least because American and Japanese forces lack a NATO-style integrated military command. Neither has much experience of operating with Taiwan.
究竟日本能如何協助不詳。特別是，因為美國及日本軍隊，缺乏一種北約樣式的整體性軍事指揮。兩者皆無太多與台灣合作的經驗。
Broadly speaking, the Japanese would focus on defending Japanese territory, including American bases; securing strategic choke-points around Japan; and providing rear-area logistical support, such as supplying fuel and ammunition and treating wounded soldiers. “Without Japan, the us cannot mobilise and surge,” says Koda Yoji, a former commander of Japan’s naval forces.
概略言之，日本人會著重於保衛日本領土，包括美國基地、確保日本周邊的戰略要塞及提供後方的後勤支援，諸如供應燃料、彈藥及治療受傷士兵。日本前海軍司令官，Koda Yoji宣稱：「沒有日本，美國就無法進行動員及增兵。」
In Washington, meanwhile, calls are growing for America to do more to defend Taiwan. Republicans, in particular, urge the Biden administration to provide better weapons and military aid, abandon strategic ambiguity and even station American troops on the island. But for the foreseeable future Taiwan is likely to remain in the twilight zone: a country whose status is undefined and whose vital partnership with America is unclear.
在此同時，於美國首府華盛頓特區，要求美國採取更多措施，來保衛台灣的呼聲日益高漲。特別是共和黨員，敦促拜登政府提供更佳武器及軍事援助、摒棄戰略模糊，甚至在島上駐軍。不過，就可預見的未來而言，台灣很可能仍處於暮光區：一個地位未定，與美國之重要夥伴關係也不詳的國家。
The invasion of Ukraine shows that war can clear away ambiguities and hesitations. Taiwan’s best hope of survival is to deny China a quick victory. It will probably have to fight alone for a time. The longer it can hold out, the likelier it is to win sympathy, admiration and military support. Even now, time may well be Taiwan’s most important military asset.
入侵烏克蘭顯示，戰爭能清除模棱兩可及猶豫不決。台灣最佳的生存希望，是不讓中國速戰速決。因為，可能必需單獨戰鬥一段時間。能持續抵抗愈久，越有可能贏得同情、欽佩及軍事支援。即使目前，時間也可能是台灣最重要的軍事資產。
“Every day, when Xi Jinping draws back the curtain, he should see the capability that Taiwan, America and the other allies have deployed and tell himself: ‘Today is not the day for an invasion,’” muses Mr Davidson. “We had to run a deterrence strategy for 40 years during the cold war. That may be what winning looks like.” The struggles of the Russian wolf show how the Chinese bei might be kept at bay.
Davidson先生宣稱：「每天，當習近平拉開帷幕時，他應該看到台灣、美國及其他盟邦已經部署的能力，而告訴自己：今天不是侵犯的日子。在冷戰期間，我們不得不進行一種威懾戰略，達40年。那或許是看似獲勝的樣子。」俄羅斯狼的此些爭鬥顯示了，中國狽會如何被困於絕境中。
網址：https://www.economist.com/briefing/what-taiwan-can-learn-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/21808850?utm_content=ed-picks-article-link-3&etear=nl_weekly_3&utm_campaign=a.the-economist-this-week&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=4/21/2022&utm_id=1140377
翻譯：許東榮
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